Constitutional design and political agency problems: the case of Colombia
| Autor | Paola Alarcón López |
| Cargo | Professor Faculty of Law, University of Medellín, Colombia |
| Páginas | 11-49 |
con-texto • revista de derecho y economía • n.º 41 • enero-junio 2014 • pp. 11-49
Constitutional design and
political agency problems:
the case of Colombia*
PAolA AlArcón lóPEz1-2
paola.alarconlopez@gmail.com
ABSTRACT
This article presents and explores, from a law and economics’ perspective, the Colombian
Constitutional structures that create potential for corruption by undermining the checks
and balances, the accountability system over politicians and in particular, by altering the
computation of the agent once is facing the decision to act according to principal interest
or behave in a corrupt way.
A case study from a Colombian high court is presented in order to illustrate the inte-
raction between the identified constitutional provisions to generate a scope for corruption.
Finally, possible constitutional amendments are suggested in order to overcome these
system failures.
Keywords: Law and Economics, Corruption, System failures, Agency problems, Cons-
titutional design, Constitution of Colombia.
1 The author would like to thank Prof. P.G. babu for his guidance, Paul cronnin and KatHerin Pérez for
their invaluable help and gloria lucy lóPez for believing in me and being my master of life.
-
for multiple national and international firms. paola.alarconlopez@gmail.com
anÁlisis económico
del derecho
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paola alarcón lópez
con-texto • revista de derecho y economía • n.º 41 • enero-junio 2014 • pp. 11-49
EL CASO DE COLOMBIA
Este artículo presenta y analiza, desde una perspectiva del Análisis Económico del Derecho,
aquellas disposiciones constitucionales que, en vez de prevenir la corrupción política, la
estimulan al afectar la división del poder, la independencia judicial y el sistema de pesos
y contrapesos, lo cual se materializa en la afectación del cómputo del agente cuando este
se enfrenta a tomar la decisión de cumplir con el principal o actuar de manera corrupta.
exponer cómo las disposiciones constitucionales identificadas interactúan entre sí para
generar incentivos a la corrupción.
Finalmente, se sugieren algunas reformas constitucionales para superar estas fallas del
sistema político constitucional.
Palabras clave: derecho y economía, problemas de agencia, corrupción, fallas del sis-
tema, diseño constitucional, constitución colombiana.
The appropriation of public funds for private purposes has been a practice of government
officials throughout history that still persists. This malpractice has become a problem that
jeopardizes legal and political institutions, democracy and economic development.
Colombia is perceived as one of the most violent and corrupt states in the world3. The
scourge of corruption in Colombian dates back to the colony era, and since then efforts
have been made to mitigate this malpractice. However, in the recent history of the country,
especially in the nineties, it was believed that corruption was favoured by the legal and
which modified The Criminal Code and The Public Contracts Act, though, the most
significant measure taken against corruption was the adoption of the new Constitution of
.
The aim of this article is to identify and explore, under a law and economics’ perspective,
the Colombian constitutional structures that contribute to political corruption instead of
preventing this malpractice by affecting the check and balance system of the state and the
-
Fajardo, L. “La corrupción heredada: pasado colonial, sistema legal y desarrollo económico en Colombia”,
2002 quoted in gaMarra Vergara “Desfalcos y regiones: un análisis de los procesos de responsabilidad
fiscal en Colombia”, 2.
badel rueda, “ Costos de la Corrupción en Colombia”, 30.
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Constitutional design and political agency problems: the case of Colombia
anÁlisis económico
del derecho
con-texto • revista de derecho y economía • n.º 41 • enero-junio 2014 • pp. 11-49
accountability over politicians. It also aims to provide a theoretical framework that explains
the negative effects of these constitutional provisions and to propose possible constitutional
amendments to overcome these political system’s failures.
The article is based on the analysis of the Principal-Agent model proposed by Professor
Klitgaard. In this model, the decision to be corrupt is based on a numerical calculation,
which payoffs are determined by the benefits and costs of acting corruptly. In this com-
putation, it is taken into account the probability of being caught and punished. Because
of that, those constitutional provisions which alter the check and balance system of the
Colombian state as affect the accountability system over politicians are analysed as political
institutions that foster corruption by affecting the probability of detection and sanction
of the corrupt behaviour. In this article, my approach is mainly analytical and speculative.
In the first section, I briefly explore the academic definitions of corruption and its eco-
nomic effects. I particularly focus on the negative effects that political corruption has had
in Colombia and how the state has responded to overcome this malpractice. I also suggest
that the core problem in the Colombian fight against corruption is its fragile and damaged
democratic institution.
The second and the third section are concerned with the Colombian constitutional
structures that foster corruption. Specifically, in the second section I start by describing the
Principal–Agent–Client model. This model has provided the economic intuition and the
reasoning used in this article to identify and explore each of the constitutional provisions
that generate a possible scope for corruption. I advocate that the presented constitutional
structures open a scope for corruption because they affect the checks and balances system
of the Colombian state and, in particular, the accountability system over politicians. In
the third section, I present a case study, which illustrates how the identified constitutional
structures interact with each other to generate the potential for corruption.
In the fourth section, I suggest that, in order to fight political corruption in Colombia,
it is necessary to strength its democratic institutions by enhancing the division of power of
the state, improving the judicial and supervisory bodies’ independence, and empowering
citizens to exercise vertical accountability.
In the fifth section, I present my conclusions. I suggest that a possible cause of politi-
cal corruption could emerge from the state’s own political system. Therefore, I argue that
Colombia should focus on overcoming the shortcomings of its political system in order to
prevent political corruption.
The economic concept of corruption can be defined as “the use of public office for private
gains”6
6 bardHan, “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, 1321.
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