Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach - Núm. 88, Enero 2021 - Revista Desarrollo y Sociedad - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 873462159

Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach

AutorCarolina Álvarez-Garavito, Hugo Nicolás Acosta-González
CargoPontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, Facultad de Economía, Quito, Ecuador. Email: calvarez324@puce.edu.ec -2 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, Facultad de Economía, Quito, Ecuador. ORCID ID: 0000- 0002-3782-1115. Email: hnacosta@puce.edu.ec
Páginas11-42
11
desarro. soc. 71, primer semestre de 2013, pp. x-xx, issn 0120-3584
Revista
Desarrollo y Sociedad Segundo cuatrimestre 2021
PP. 11-42, ISSN 0120-3584
E-ISSN 1900-7760
88
Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach
Carolina Álvarez-Garavito1
Hugo Nicolás Acosta-González2
DOI: 10.13043/DYS.88.1
Abstract
Justification: The rising cases of femicide across Latin America have pushed
governments to enact specific laws criminalizing this gender-based murder
to deter violence and crime against women. However, given the lack of data,
the effect of these legislations is unknown. We aim to understand the causes
and mechanisms of femicide across Latin American countries, as well as the
possible effect of the legislation on femicide rate. We propose an economic
approach that combines ideas proposed by Becker’s economics of crime and
bargaining household models to understand the mechanisms behind femicide.
The proposed approach suggests that legislation has a positive effect on reduc-
ing the number of murders of women by increasing the likelihood of the crimi-
nal being convicted and punished, thus changing these criminals’ incentives
to commit the crime. However, government inaction and impunity towards
femicide may impede the effectiveness of legislation in deterring criminal
behavior. As data on femicide becomes available, the effect of the legislation
on femicide rates could be estimated using a difference in difference method.
Keywords: Intimate Partner Violence, Legislation, Microeconomics, Latin
America
JEL Code: K14, N36
1 Pontif icia Un iversi dad Cató lica de l Ecuado r, Facult ad de Eco nomía, Quito, E cuador. Em ail: ca lvarez 324@
puce.edu.ec
2 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, Facultad de Economía, Quito, Ecuador. ORCID ID: 0000-
0002-3782-1115. Email: hnacosta@puce.edu.ec
This paper was received on July 23, 2020, revised on February 11, 2021, and finally accepted on April
19, 2021.
12 Revista
Desarrollo y Sociedad
Segundo cuatrimestre 2021
PP. 11-42, ISSN 0120-3584
E-ISSN 1900-7760
88
El feminicidio en América Latina: Un enfoque
económico
Carolina Álvarez Garavito3
Hugo Nicolás Acosta González4
DOI: 10.13043/DYS.88.1
Resumen
Justificación: El creciente número de casos de femicidio en América Latina ha
impulsado a los gobiernos de la región a tipificarlo como delito para disuadir la
violencia y el crimen contra las mujeres. Sin embargo, se desconoce el efecto
de estas leyes por la falta de datos disponibles. Se pretende conocer las causas
y mecanismos del femicidio en los países de América Latina, así como el posi-
ble efecto de las leyes contra este delito. Proponemos un enfoque económico
que combina las ideas de la economía del crimen de Becker y los modelos de
negociación de los hogares para entender los mecanismos detrás del femici-
dio. El enfoque propuesto sugiere que la legislación tiene un efecto positivo en
la reducción del número de asesinatos de mujeres al aumentar la probabilidad
del criminal de ser condenado y castigado, cambiando así los incentivos de los
criminales para cometer el delito. Sin embargo, la inacción y la impunidad de
los gobiernos hacia el femicidio podrían impedir la eficacia de la legislación para
disuadir el comportamiento criminal. A medida que se disponga de mayor canti-
dad de datos sobre femicidio, se podrá estimar el efecto de la legislación sobre
la ocurrencia de este delito utilizando el método de diferencias en diferencias.
Palab ras c lave: Vi ole nci a de par eja , Le gis lac ió n, M icr oec ono mía , Am éri ca L at ina
Clasificación JEL: K14, N36
3 Pontif icia Un iversi dad Cató lica de l Ecuado r, Facult ad de Eco nomía, Quito, E cuador. E mail: ca lvarez 324@
puce.edu.ec
4 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, Facultad de Economía, Quito, Ecuador. ORCID ID: 0000-
0002-3782-1115. Email: hnacosta@puce.edu.ec
Este artículo fue recibido el 23 de julio del 2020, revisado el 11 de febrero del 2021 y finalmente
aceptado el 19 de abril del 2021.
Carolina Álvarez-Garavito and Hugo Nicolás Acosta-González 13
desarro. soc. 88, bogo, segundo cuatrimestre de 2021, pp. 11-42, issn 0120-3584, e-issn 1900-7760, doi: 10.13043/dys.88.1
Introduction
Violence against women has been recognized as a severe violation of human
rights and an obstacle on the path to gender equality, affecting all women
worldwide (WHO, 2005). One of the most common forms of violence against
women is Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), perpetrated by a husband or some-
one close to the victim (Garcia-Moreno and Heise, 2002). Globally, a consid-
erable proportion of women experience IPV, where one out of three women
reported having been victims of physical, sexual, or psychological violence
from their intimate partner at least once in their lives (WHO, 2013). Defined
by Diana Russell as the the killing of a female specifically because she is a
female,” femicide is the most severe consequence of IPV (PATH, 2008). About
66,000 women are violently killed every year, accounting for approximately
17% of all victims of intentional homicides (Nowak, 2012).
Domestic abuse and femicide rates are particularly high in Latin America, a
region with the second-highest female homicide rate in the world, second only
to Africa (WHO, 2013). Among the 25 countries that feature high and very high
femicide rates, 14 are in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) (Alvazzi del
Fratte, 2011), which may explain why several of the region’s countries have
enacted legislation criminalizing femicide and setting different punishments
since 2007. However, academic research on the effectiveness of such laws
and its effect on the aggressor’s behavior and decisions are scarce (Carrigan,
2016; Saccomano, 2015; Palma Solis, Vives-Caces and Álvarez-Dardet, 2008).
The major problem in addressing femicide is the lack of official and reliable
data, and the impossibility to compare countries since data collection meth-
ods differs across them (Carrigan, 2016).
This paper proposes a novel perspective for addressing the problem of femi-
cide. First, we introduce a simple modification of the ecological model pro-
posed by Heise (1998), to understand the causes and mechanisms of IPV and
femicide across the LAC region. Second, we review microeconomic models,
much of them inspired by the work of Gary Becker, in order to expose the
basic principles of the economics of crime. In this respect, we cover several
studies using Bargaining Household Models that explain the interactions of
individuals within an abusive relationship (Manser and Brown, 1980; McEl-
roy and Horney, 1981; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997). The basic idea behind
the literature review is to expose the insights of economic theory on IPV and
Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach
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desarro. soc. 88, bogo, segundo cuatrimestre de 2021, pp. 11-42, issn 0120-3584, e-issn 1900-7760, doi: 10.13043/dys.88.1
apply them to femicide. We propose an economic approach to femicide that
formally expresses the decision-making process of a potential murderer of
women and the effects of law enforcement on his incentives to commit the
crime. The major conclusion is that, after some analytical considerations, for-
mal economic models support the notion that offenders respond to incentives
and, in particular, that punishment and law enforcement might deter the com-
mission of specific crimes, including IPV and femicide. However, governments’
inaction and impunity towards murders of women could make such laws fail
at their objective to deter femicide.
1. Intimate Partner Violence and Femicide in Latin America
Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) is considered one of the most common forms of
violence against women, almost one-third (30%) of all women worldwide have
experienced it at some point in their lives (WHO, 2013). This type of violence is
defined as the physical, sexual and/or psychological harm perpetrated by a per-
son with whom the victim has a close personal relationship, such as a spouse,
boyfriend/girlfriend, dating partner, or ongoing sexual partner (Breiding et al.
2015; WHO, 2012). IPV has many repercussions, ranging from direct physical
problems like poor health, HIV infections, chronic diseases, mental illness, and
substance abuse problems (Hidrobo et al. 2016) to direct and indirect eco-
nomic costs related to treatment and productivity losses (Waters et al. 2004).
Although this kind of gender-based violence occurs in all settings and among
all socioeconomic groups, IPV rates are particularly high in Latin America,
where the culture of machismo is widely accepted and predominant. This
idiosyncrasy conditions gender-roles and encourages constraints on girls’ and
women’s freedom, misogynist behavior, and recurring violence with impunity
(Alvazzi del Fratte, 2011). According to the World Health Organization (2013),
the Americas reported the second-highest prevalence, with approximately 30%
of women experiencing lifetime exposure to intimate partner violence. The
highest rates in the region, are found in the Andean area and Central Latin
America, with 40.6% and 29.5% of lifetime prevalence of IPV, respectively.
The ultimate and most extreme consequence of IPV is murder (Hidrobo et al.
2016), best known as femicide. Diana Russell, feminist activist and author of
the term in 2001, defined it as “the killing of a female specifically because they
Carolina Álvarez-Garavito and Hugo Nicolás Acosta-González 15
desarro. soc. 88, bogo, segundo cuatrimestre de 2021, pp. 11-42, issn 0120-3584, e-issn 1900-7760, doi: 10.13043/dys.88.1
are female,5 which means that it is a crime committed under gender-based
causes. Within a background of domestic violence, these crimes are not isolated
incidents that occur unexpectedly but rather the ultimate act of violence in a
continuous relationship of discrimination, oppression, and abuse, which makes
them direct killings with an identifiable perpetrator (United Nations, 2012).
The lack of reliable data and scarce official statistics on femicide in Latin
American countries, especially time-series data on the occurrence of fem-
icide, impedes a proper evaluation of the severity of the problem (Joseph,
2017). However, by looking at the existing limited data, it is clear that femi-
cide is a big concern within the Latin American region. According to Alvazzi
del Fratte (2011), among the 25 countries that feature high and very high gen-
der-related killings of women, 14 are in the Americas: four in the Caribbean,
four in Central America, and six in South America6. The World Health Orga-
nization (2013) showed that the median prevalence of femicide in the region
was 38%. According to data compiled by CEPALSTAT and the Gender Equality
Observatory for Latin America and the Caribbean for 20177, El Salvador has
the highest number of perpetrated femicides, with 345 total cases, followed
by Argentina with 251 and Honduras with 235. Figure 1 shows femicide data
expressed as the total number, as well as the rate per 100,000 for those coun-
tries with available data8.
A proportion of the overall cases of femicide are a consequence of a history
of intimate partner violence. As expressed above, many gender-related killings
are perpetrated by a current or former partner with a background of domestic
abuse. Figure 2 shows the number of IPV-related femicide cases by countries
for which data is available for the 2017. For example, out of the 251 cases of
femicide in Argentina, 148 were caused by IPV. The number of IPV related kill-
ings is very high across Latin American countries, which implies that the per-
petrators of gender-based murders are close to the victim and that intimate
5 Introductory speech presented to the United Nations Symposium on Femicide (2012).
6 The countries are Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Venezuela.
7 Database from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
8 Data availability differs significantly across countries and years, resulting in missing, partial, or in-
complete data for each country. For this and following statistical analysis, countries with limited or no
available data were not considered. ECLAC might rectify this data in future.
Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach
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partner violence is likely to end up in femicide. It is interesting to observe
that El Salvador does not present a high rate of IPV-related femicide, despite
the high number of total femicide cases. This could be due to the high rates of
gang-related violence. Women in vulnerable situations such as those who live
in poverty or in marginal urban areas are more likely to suffer from gang vio-
lence since they experience higher exposure to criminal activity. In this sense,
gang members take advantage of females by inflicting physical and sexual
violence on them, with consequences such as murder. Thus, most of the femi-
cide cases in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras may be a
consequence of gang violence rather than intimate partner abuse (Figure 2)
(Prieto-Carrón, Thomson and Macdonald, 2007).
Meanwhile, the causes of IPV and femicide have been broadly discussed among
scholars from different perspectives and academic disciplines. Thus, little con-
sensus has been reached, since each discipline’s narrowness tends to produce
a single-factor theory for domestic violence, which does not help to explain
Figure 1. Cases of femicide by country, 2017
El Salvador
Argentina
Honduras
Guatemala
República Dominicana
Perú
Bolivia
Ecuador
Paraguay
Chile
Costa Rica
Uruguay
Panamá
El Salvador
Honduras
Guatemala
República Dominicana
Bolivia
Paraguay
Uruguay
Ecuador
Costa Rica
Argentina
Panamá
Perú
Chile
0 100 200
Total cases of femicide
300 400 0 10 122 4
Femicide rate per 100.000 women
6 8
345
251
235
221
119
116
110
109
53
34
26
23
18 0.4
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.1
1.3
1.3
1.6
2
2.2
2.6
5.1
10.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and Gender Equality Observatory
for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Carolina Álvarez-Garavito and Hugo Nicolás Acosta-González 17
desarro. soc. 88, bogo, segundo cuatrimestre de 2021, pp. 11-42, issn 0120-3584, e-issn 1900-7760, doi: 10.13043/dys.88.1
the complexity of the issue in real life (Heise, 1998). For example, the eco-
nomic perspective suggests that the causes of domestic abuse are rooted in
the asymmetry of income distribution within the household and the inability
of women to leave the abusive relationship because of economic constraints.
At first, this could be a good predictor for IPV and femicide in Latin America;
however, there exist multiple other causes surrounding the incidence of IPV
and female murder beyond economic burdens.
The ecological approach first proposed by Heise (1998) is an integrative theory
intended to explain the complexity of the causes surrounding intimate part-
ner violence. The author conceptualizes violence as an inter-play of four sys-
tems or environments: personal, microsystem, exosystem, and macrosystem.
Each system is composed of several factors that tend to increase the likelihood
of IPV. In this study, we apply the ecological framework of intimate partner
violence specifically to the Latin American reality, mainly to expose the pos-
sible causes of IPV and femicide arising from socio-cultural and institutional
Figure 2. Total number of femicides and IPV-relate femicides by country, 2017
El Salvador
Argentina
República Dominicana
Perú
Paraguay
Chile
Costa Rica
Uruguay
0 100 200
Femicide cases
Femicide cases related to IPV
300 400
345
251
148
107
119
116
105
53
34
44
37
26
14
23
20
23
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and Gender Equality Observatory
for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach
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factors. To do so, we add a fifth system proposed by Heise to the model, which
is government action towards incidents of IPV and cases of femicide (Figure 3).
Figure 3. Ecological model
Government Societal Community Relationship Individual
1. Individual-level factors refer to those factors that arise from each
person’s personal experiences, and that increase the likelihood of do-
mestic abuse. Such factors include witnessing marital violence as a child
(Ellsberg and Heise, 2005; Capaldi et al. 2012), having had an absent or
alcohol-dependent father (Ellsberg and Heise, 2005), and having been
physically or sexually abused as a child (Ellsberg and Heise, 2005, Knaul
and Ramirez, 2005). In both cases, this leads to an ongoing situation
of domestic violence from one generation to the next, since the child
who is exposed to violence in his early years will tend to show violent
behavior in his adult life.
2. Relationship-level factors (microsystem) refer to a family’s structure.
These include male dominance in the family and male control of wealth
in the family. The former alludes to the patriarchal family structure that
is extremely common in Latin American households, whereas the latter
refers to the economic dependence that women are subject to when they
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do not make an income of their own (Oduro, Deere and Catanzarite, 2015).
This lack of economic autonomy represents a constraint for those women
who seek to leave an abusive relationship but do not have the sufficient
resources to make it on their own. Thus, the chances of a woman leaving
a violent relationship are low if she has little economic autonomy.
Villareal (2007) argues that the evidence on the relationship between
women’s labor force participation and IPV is mixed (positive, negative,
and no relation). The positive relation might occur when the male partner
cannot enforce his dominance from an economic perspective, hence he
uses violence as a source of domination in the relationship. If the woman is
employed, from the male perspective, this could be seen as a threat to his
domination, which could lead him to exert violence. Friedemann-Sánchez
and Lovatón (2012) found that women’s labor force participation is positi-
vely associated with IPV considering that her labor income is insufficient
to allow her to negotiate with the partner or it does not represent a real
threat that might lead her to leave the relationship. Gage and Thomas
(2017) found that after controlling for several covariables, women’s labor
force participation increases IPV victimization.
On the other hand, the negative relationship between women’s employment
and violence is based on the idea that participation in labor market lowers
violent victimization. This occurs because women’s employment reduces
their economic dependency on their partner, and encourages them not to
tolerate violence. Villareal (2007) found that women’s employment reduces
the risk of violence, but that the employment decision is highly influenced
by the partner (controlling behavior). Hidrobo et al. (2016) found that
cash transfer programs targeting women reduce controlling behavior and
IPV. The authors suggest that a possible mechanism is that the transfers
might reduce labor participation and increase time spent at home with
the partner, which in turn reduces the frequency of IPV.
Figure 4 shows the percentage of men and women aged 15 and above,
who do not have an income of their own in Latin American countries. The
proportion of women who lack their own income is higher than the pro-
portion of men in such a situation. This dependency makes them vulnerable
and dependent on others, which can have a trigger effect on men who are
abusive towards their partners.
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3. Community-level factors (exosystem) include all the external influences
that come from the surrounding environment of the household. These
include low socioeconomic status, unemployment, and delinquent peer
associations (Heise, 1998). In Latin America, poverty and gang violence
are highly correlated to violence towards women and femicide (Amnesty
International, 2005; Prieto-Carrón, Thomson and Macdonald, 2007). Wo-
men who live in communities characterized by high levels of criminality
such as organized crime, drug trafficking, and high homicide rates are
more likely to become a victim of femicide (Prieto-Carrón, Thomson and
Macdonald, 2007).
4. Societal-level factors (macrosystem) refer to all the cultural values and
set of beliefs that shape gender roles within the family and within society.
This is where Latin America’s machismo culture fits as a clear example
of patriarchy and oppression towards women that is acceptable from the
cultural point of view. Machismo can be expressed as hypermasculine,
chauvinistic, and aggressive behavior by men that reflects their belief
Figure 4. Percentage of population aged 15 and over without own income disaggre-
gated by gender, 2014
Guatemala
El Salvador
Ecuador
Costa Rica
Paraguay
Mexico
Dominican Republic
Peru
Panama
Brazil
Colombia
Uruguay
010 20
Men Women
30 40 50
14 51
16 35.7
35.6
32.1
30.1
29.7
28.9
28.1
26.8
26.3
35
9.1
10.5
13.6
7.5
12.6
15.1
8.1
15.7
10.4
5.3 14
Perce ntag e
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and Gender Equality Observatory
for Latin America and the Caribbean.
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that men have certain rights and privileges over women (Oxtoby, 2009).
For a married man, this means that his wife must fulfill his desires and
that he can control her. For example, he can prevent her from seeing her
friends, control contact with her family, control where she is all the time,
have jealousy attacks if she speaks with another man, control the money
she earns or receives, among others (Bott et al.2012). Moreover, violence
becomes an instrumental tool when men want to make women obey,
leading to higher rates of IPV and female murder rates.
5. Government action refers to the specific actions of authorities and the
justice system to help women in vulnerable positions, such as the victims
of IPV. Since the government should work as a regulator, law enforcement
against IPV, and government resources used for shelters and welfare pay-
ments should increase women’s rights and protection so they can either
leave the relationship or so that IPV within the household stops. This
particular system, never before exposed in any ecological IPV framework,
is extremely important, as Gelles (1983) exposes that intimate partner
violence occurs when the rewards of violent behavior outweigh the risks.
In other words, violence is perpetrated when no costs related to violent
behavior exist9. According to the author, the rewards for the use of vio-
lence should decrease by increasing the costs related to it,; for example,
by imposing stricter legal and social consequences (Gelles, 1983). Thus,
an effective response to IPV and femicide is crucial to prevent an ongoing
situation of crime perpetration and impunity.
Among some of the strategies to prevent IPV, the WHO (2012) recommends
early intervention for at-risk families, since child abuse and maltreatment
might predict future violent behavior by men. However, “efforts to include
an IPV component in these programs are currently being tested” (WHO
2012). To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence on these programs.
Education, wealth, labor status should encourage economic independen-
ce and prevent women from suffering domestic violence. Jewkes (2002)
argues that education is important for women because it confers social
empowerment, self-confidence, and the ability to use information and
resources for their own well-being. Women are more likely to justify IPV
than men, and this might occur since access to education and literacy rate
are higher for men. Based on a literature review, Wang (2016) argues that
9 Exchange/social Control Theory, Gelles (1983).
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among several factors that influence attitude toward IPV, education is the
most important. According to Tenkorang et al. (2013), women who have
reached higher levels of education are less likely to report physical abuse
than women with no education. Boyle et al. (2009) found that women’s
education reduces the risk of exposure to IPV.
2. Femicide in National Legislation
The first legislative efforts in the region to address violence against women
and domestic violence incidents surged after the meetings of the Committee
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (1992) and the Belém
do Pará Convention (1994). Both brought regional agreement on the need to
legislate this type of gender-based aggression by amending legal frameworks
and persecuting intra-family violence. In this vein, beginning in 2007, all LAC
countries have implemented either comprehensive legislation, laws against
violence, or an action plan to combat violence against women10.
Meanwhile, in the face of the prevalence of and increasing femicide rates across
the region, various countries enacted specific legislation punishing the violent
death of a woman at the hands of an intimate partner or a former intimate
partner. The idea of having specific laws against femicide is based on the fact
that femicide has different causes from homicide; therefore, it has to be typi-
fied as a crime in itself (Saccomano, 2015). Since 2007, 14 countries in the
LAC region have incorporated laws against femicide in their national legisla-
tion, but there are differences between countries in terms of how the legisla-
tion approaches this crime. Some countries like Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala,
El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Ecuador, Honduras, Panama, and Bolivia,
have criminalized femicide/feminicide11 as a crime different from homicide as
it is perpetrated because of gender-based causes. On the other hand, coun-
tries like Argentina, Venezuela, and Colombia have typified femicide as an
aggravating circumstance for homicide, which means that the legal system
10 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 2014.
11 Radical feminist anthropologist and Congresswoman, Marcela Lagarde, translated the term into Spanish
as feminicide [feminicidio]. Lagarde modified the term proposed by Russell by adding “the impunity
with which these crimes are typically treated in South America,” implying that the government and
the judicial structures are also to blame for allowing misogyny. Throughout the LAC region, the terms
femicide and feminicide are used interchangeably.
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does not recognize the concept of femicide (ECLAC, 2014). In this sense, the
penalties also differ from country to country, ranging from 12 years in prison
(Brazil) to life imprisonment (Chile). Other examples include 15 years in prison
(Peru), 20 to 40 years in jail (Colombia), and 40 to 60 years in prison, and a
fine of USD 2,000 (Mexico).
Table 1. Femicide legislation in Latin America
Country Year of law
enactment Type of offense Sentence length
Argentina 2012 Aggravated homicide Life imprisonment
Bolivia 2013 Femicide 30 years
Brazil 2015 Femicide 12 to 30 years
Chile 2010
Femicide; feminization of homicide
aggravated by the relationship
between victim and murderer.
Life imprisonment
Colombia 2015 Femicide 20 to 41 years
Costa Rica 2007
Femicide; feminization of homicide
aggravated by the relationship
between victim and murderer.
20-35 years, plus
disqualification from holding
public office positions.
Dominican
Republic 2014 Femicide 30 to 40 years
Ecuador 2014 Femicide 22 to 26 years
El Salvador 2012 Femicide 20 to 35 years
Guatemala 2008 Femicide 25 to 50 years
Honduras 2013 Femicide 30 to 40 years
Mexico 2012 Femicide 40 and 60 years in prison,
plus fine.
Nicaragua 2012 Femicide 15 years up to life
imprisonment.
Paraguay 2016 Femicide 10 to 30 years
Panama 2013 Femicide 25 to 30 years
Peru 2013 Feminicide 15 up to 24 years
Uruguay 2017 Femicide 15 to 30 years
Venezuela 2014 Femicide 20 to 30 years
Source: UN Women (2018), Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Although the definitions and legislation related to femicide vary across LAC
countries, the acknowledgment of the concept and the persecution of the crime
Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach
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should be considered important progress towards the eradication of violence
against women. Accordingly, an assessment of such laws is essential to test-
ing whether or not the legislation is effective. However, only a few studies
have focused on the effects of femicide legislation on femicide rates (Carrigan,
2016; Saccomano, 2015). This may be due to the constraint arising from the
lack of official data on femicide cases, and the inconsistency in country-level
data availability, especially in Latin America (Stöckl et al. 2013).
3. Effectiveness of Femicide Legislation
Because of the difficulty involved in assessing femicide legislation in the
LAC region using data and statistical analyses, this paper proposes a dif-
ferent approach to address the issue. Here, we analyze how legislation and
penalties from femicide shape an individual’s behavior and affect his deci-
sion-making process by making crime more costly and less attractive to
offenders. Through a review of the economic approach of crime and family
—originally proposed by Gary Becker— and later coverage of various domes-
tic violence models, we can obtain a theoretical approach that formalizes
the possible effects of law enforcement towards femicide and how it affects
criminals’ decisions.
The following section is organized as follows. The first part will introduce
Becker’s model of crime to understand criminals’ rationale and how punish-
ment affects their criminal behavior. The second part will deal with models of
the decision-making process within marriages to show how couples interact
with each other in situations of domestic violence. As stated earlier, femicide
is the ultimate consequence of an ongoing cycle of violence against the female
partner in an abusive relationship, which makes it important to describe the
dynamics of domestic violence that could eventually lead to femicide. Finally,
the third section introduces our approach to the effects of femicide laws
on criminal behavior to understand the aggressor’s incentives and decisions
behind femicide crimes and later, the effect of femicide laws on their decision
of whether to commit the crime.
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3.1. Literature Review of Economics of Crime
and IPV Bargaining Models
Like any other economic approach to model legislation towards any crime, it is
important to first consider Becker’s theory of crime. In his seminal work, Crime
and Punishment: An Economic Approach, Becker describes criminals as ratio-
nal agents and states “a person commits an offense if the expected utility to
him exceeds the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at
other activities” (Becker, 1968). In this sense, criminals will choose an opti-
mal number of offenses to maximize their utility. The number of offenses a
criminal will execute is a function of the probability of conviction, the pun-
ishment if convicted, and other relevant variables, such as income related
to legal and other illegal activities and his willingness to commit an illegal
act. Both probabilities of conviction and punishments associated with con-
viction have negative effects on the number of offenses committed by crim-
inals. Although Becker’s model was not developed for any specific type of
crime, it can be used to address any criminal activity. In our case, it could be
the first attempt to tackle the effect that laws punishing femicide have on
the aggressor’s behavior.
Becker’s crime model is important in explaining the rationality behind a
criminal’s behavior and the factors that restrict their actions. However, when
addressing intimate partner violence, the model does not incorporate enough
information for proper analysis since it only considers the utility function of
the criminal. In situations of domestic violence, it is important to consider the
victim’s utility function as well, to model the interaction between both parties
(Tauchen, Witte and Long, 1991). Therefore, we incorporate bargaining models
of marriage, to examine how individuals make decisions in an abusive intimate
relationship and how new laws against violence will shape this interaction.
In the seminal work of Gary Becker (1973, 1974) on family economics the
objective of the married couple is to maximize a single utility function con-
strained to the household production function. In the end, the marriage will
have an optimal amount of aggregate consumption. Although no violent rela-
tionship is being modeled here, the basic idea we extract from Becker’s anal-
ysis is that married couples behave altruistically, which means that they will
cooperate and that there exists a single utility function for the whole family.
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Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy and Horney (1981) developed bargain-
ing models to explain intra-household decisions and interactions. Here, each
spouse has their own utility function with distinct preferences and both of
them will later determine a cooperative utility function for the whole family.
The difference with Becker’s optimization solution is that bargaining models
allow for discrepancies and conflicting preferences between partners, which
implies that the optimal household’s consumption must provide a minimum
utility level for each spouse to stay in the relationship. In this way, there is an
individual’s threat point to abandon the marriage that will somehow restrict
the other person’s behavior and the allocation of resources within the house-
hold. However, the dictatorial version of the bargaining model suggests that, in
some relationships, power is asymmetrical and this makes individuals unequal.
The model identifies one individual as the dominant partner who maximizes his
utility and provides only the minimum amount of utility to his partner; hence
she remains in the relationship. The final optimization solution is, actually,
the optimization for the dominant partner, which implies that these kinds of
relationships are not altruistic.
Although the dictatorial bargaining model captures several characteristics of
violent relationships like distinct preferences, asymmetric treatment, and domi-
nance, Tauchen et al (1991) argues that the dictatorial bargaining model does
not take into account the volatility and instability of violent intimate partner
relationships. This means that the dominant partner in the dictatorial bar-
gaining model does not necessarily assure the other person a minimum level
of utility, hence she decides to stay in the relationship. Tauchen et al. develop
a domestic violence non-cooperative model using a game theory approach
in her paper Domestic Violence: A non-random affair. The model is based on
family and crime economics, since intimate partner violence is a crime com-
mitted within the household and under the spouse’s decisions and interac-
tions. Thus, the author allows the incorporation into the model of sanctions
against abusers and analyzes its effect on the partner’s behavior and deci-
sions within the household.
In Tauchen’s model, the male is the dominant partner in the relationship and
has expressive and instrumental motives for inflicting violence. Expressive
violence refers to the type of violence that gives pleasure to the aggressor,
whereas instrumental violence is a form of dominance and it is inflicted to
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control and impose certain rules of behavior to his partner. The rules include
the use of financial funds, contact with friends and family, and the provision
of certain services within the home or directly to the male. If the rules are not
obeyed, the male will credibly threaten his partner to increase the violence he
inflicts on her. His utility is an increasing function of violence and the level of
services, and a decreasing function of the sanctions imposed on him for his
behavior. On the other hand, the woman’s utility function also depends on the
level of violence, services, and sanctions, but an uncertainty factor is incorpo-
rated in her utility function. This is set as a random variable that captures the
male’s uncertainty towards the female’s preferences and behavior. Her utility
is a decreasing function of services and violence, and an increasing function
of both sanctions and uncertainty.
However, Tauchen’s assumption of the volatile nature of abusive relationships
suggests that this equilibrium is far from being stable. In this sense, there is
no guarantee that the male will act pacifically if the female obeys his rules.
This means that, even if she obeys, the male partner could still use violence
with expressive motives and still perpetrate domestic violence. Thus, the only
way of ensuring non-violent behavior from the male is either: i) to raise the
sanctions for domestic abuse; or ii) to improve the probabilities of her leav-
ing the relationship.
Higher sanctions decrease the male’s utility and increase the costs related to
violence —because of the monetary fine imposed on him— or days in prison,
which reduces his productivity due to absence at work. According to Becker’s
economics of crime, the male acts like a rational individual who makes deci-
sions through a cost-benefit analysis. If higher sanctions increase his costs,
then the expected utility from committing the crime will be lower than the
expected utility of not committing the crime, decreasing the level of offenses
and abuse directed to his partner. In this sense, the laws of eradication of
violence against women in the Latin American region could have a positive
effect on the well-being of women who are victims of intimate partner vio-
lence since they would change the incentives behind the abuser’s behavior.
On the other hand, to improve women’s opportunities outside the marriage,
we need to take into account that, in Tauchen’s model, the probability of the
woman leaving the relationship is extremely low as it follows the assumption
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that the woman does not participate in the labor market. This income con-
straint precludes the possibility of her being able to survive outside the rela-
tionship and implies that she depends economically on her partner. As noted
in the ecological framework developed in the previous section, this is a real-
ity in many countries of the LAC region, the occupational status of women is
negatively correlated with the prevalence of intimate partner violence (Yodanis,
2004). Many empirical studies have demonstrated that empowering women
through economic income might reduce domestic abuse (Oduro, Deere, and
Catanzarite, 2015).
In Latin America, particular interest has been paid to the effect of conditional
cash transfers on IPV (Bobonis, González-Brenes, and Castro, 2013; Hidrobo
and Fernand, 2013). All of them agree that a higher income represents more
autonomy for women and that it significantly decreases violence within the
household. Opportunities outside the relationship can also be improved by pro-
viding services for battered women. Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) proposed a
model that showed the effects of outside alternatives including services such
as shelters and support lines on women’s utility and level of violence experi-
enced. The model concludes that the higher the external services, the lower
the violence, therefore the higher the probability of her leaving the marriage.
Before starting a relationship, the woman does not know whether her part-
ner is violent or not, but when she is already in the relationship, she finds out
precisely his level of violence. Hence, we propose a game with static, complete
information to understand the motivation behind femicide resulting from a
relationship with asymmetrical power favoring the man. He has three options:
(i) to inflict a high level of violence (VH), (ii) to inflict a low level of violence
(VL), and (ii) not to inflict violence (NV). The woman has three choices: (i) to
cooperate or obey for fear of punishment (O), (ii) not to cooperate or to dis-
obey (D), or (iii) leave the relationship (L). The action chosen by each player
is at least as good, according to his/her preferences, as every other available
action. The following is the game representation using an extensive form and
a payoff matrix.
For men, their utility is an increasing function of the level of violence inflicted
on his partner, hence, the payoffs related to performing acts of violence against
the woman are positive. If the woman obeys (O), he prefers not to inflict vio-
lence getting a payoff of 3, while if the woman chooses to disobey (D) or to
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leave the relationship (L), the man choose to inflict a high level of violence
(VH), which yields him a payoff of 3. On the other hand, from the woman’s
perspective, if her partner is highly violent (VH), she prefers to disobey (D) or
to leave the relationship (L), which yields her a payoff of 2, while if the man
is not violent (NV), she chooses to obey (O) getting a payoff of 3. The solution
for this game has three equilibria (VH, D) (VH, L) (NV, O). The first two equilib-
ria (VH, D) (VH, L) describe action pairs of a violent man VH with a woman who
chooses to disobeys (D) or to leave the relationship (L), we called these Femi-
cide equilibria considering that women are killed by a current or former vio-
lent partner. The third equilibria we called the Social equilibria (NV, O), which
describes an action of a non-violent man and a cooperative (obedient) woman
who is not killed by her partner.
3.2. Femicide legislations under rationality assumptions
The previous section showed that the bargaining equilibrium for households
involved in abusive relationships of obeying (female) and non-violence (male)
is not sustainable over time. If the probabilities of her leaving the marriage or
relationship are low due to the lack of external services and opportunities, we
can conclude intuitively that the violence can increase continuously and even
Man
Man
Woman
Femicide equilibria Social equilibria
(1,1) (1,1) (1,1)(3,2) (3,3) (-2,1) (-1,1)(3,2) (2,2)
VH
VH
VL
NV
VLNV
O D L
O D L
O D L O D L
Woman
Woman
Woman
1,1
2,2
3,3
3,2
1,1
-2,1
3,2
1,1
-1,1
Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach
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end up in the man killing the woman. Even if the woman could leave the rela-
tionship because she has enough personal income to be able to do so, there
is no guarantee that the man would stop harassing her. This is reflected in
the high femicide rates committed by a victim’s former partner (see Figure 1).
Thus, the traditional bargaining models that model IPV and the effects of law
enforcement are not be appropriate to address the crime of femicide, since
the incentives to commit the crime are different in both cases. Here, we pro-
pose a simple approach that captures the effect of government laws against
femicide on the decision of abusive men to perpetrate such crimes by making
several assumptions of men’s incentives and behavior in this specific setting.
We also include government intervention, as its actions determine, influence,
and shape the criminal’s decision-making process.
The basic assumption in this section is that both men and women behave
rationally, which means they will maximize the utility of the relationship and
minimize the costs of their actions. Also, if a man is so violent that femicide
is a plausible outcome, there is no limit to the level of violence inflicted on
his partner. Additionally, the woman’s strategy to leave the marriage could
not prevent her from getting killed by his partner, since there is a high prob-
ability that he will keep harassing her after she abandons him.
Since most of femicide cases occur after the victim has already left the rela-
tionship, an interesting insight arising is that outside opportunities (like family
support and economic aid) might not help the victim, as he will eventually find
and kill her. If this holds, the man will no longer incorporate her utility function
into his utility (since he no longer cares about providing her a minimum utility
level) and his optimization process will not be subject to her utility’s threshold12.
In such a scenario, the only optimization constraint that could restricts the
man’s decisions and incentives to commit murder is the government’s action
12 Famer and Tiefenthaler (1997) propose an IPV model in which the male’s utility is a function of self-
esteem, consumption, marital capital, and the female’s utility threshold. This threshold represents the
minimum utility level that she needs to obtain from the marriage. Otherwise, she will leave. Thus, the
male’s maximization is:
ma
x,
,
,
Usvc
Mm
Vcm
()
()
subject to
UU
ww
=
This will later provide an equilibrium for the level of violence and consumption of the marriage. Note
that the constrained optimization process for the man limits the level of violence he can inflict on her.
Carolina Álvarez-Garavito and Hugo Nicolás Acosta-González 31
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towards femicide. In this vein, law enforcement against femicide should work
as a constraint to his decision to commit the crime. Thus, our approach could
be seen as an interaction between the man and the government.
Let the man’s utility function from committing femicide be:
UU
vsofu
MM
=
()
,,,,
where v is the level of violence towards his partner, s are the sanctions from
committing femicide, o is the obedience he receives from his partner, f is a
dummy variable for whether he commits femicide or not and u are other
external factors, like belonging to a gang or violence within the community13.
His utility is a decreasing function of sanctions and an increasing function of
violence, femicide and obedience of the female.
U
v
U
o
U
f
U
m
v
m
m
o
m
m
f
m
m
s
m
0
0
0
0
The male maximization utility from committing the crime is constrained by the
government’s actions: (i) apprehension, and (ii) conviction (punishing the crim-
inal for his crime). Considering that the male has no certainty of whether he
would be apprehended or not (and convicted or not if apprehended), he assigns
probabilities to the various possible outcomes from perpetrating the crime.
Thus, his expected utility can be expressed as:
max,,,,,,,
EU vsofupEU pEUpEU p
m
a
ma amna
ca
mc
ca
()
=+
()
+
()
+
(
11
))
EUmnc,
where p
a
is the male’s subjective probability of apprehension and pca
()
is the conditional probability of conviction once he has been apprehended.
13 This is based on the ecological approach developed in the previous section, where community-level factors
like belonging to a certain gang increase the probability of femicide by enforcing machismo ideals.
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1
()
pa is the pro bab ili ty o f no t be ing app reh end ed a nd 1
()
pca
is the pro b-
ability of not being convicted even if he got apprehended.
Following Becker’s approach, the male’s decision-making process should be
affected by raising the probabilities of being apprehended and convicted.
Both have a negative effect on the decision of committing the crime, since
they raise the costs related to perpetrating the harm. If both probabilities are
high enough, the male’s incentives to commit murder could be reversed and
therefore, no crime would take place.
The enactment of laws, such as the laws against femicide in LAC, should be
enough to raise the probabilities of apprehension and punishment. However,
the effectiveness of the law is an important factor when it comes to shap-
ing criminal behaviors. If there were no trust in the effective action of the
government, the male’s subjective probabilities assigned to each outcome
would be very low, even though laws have already been enacted. The subjec-
tive probabilities are, in fact, a function from past experiences; the individ-
ual will take past information to forecast future outcomes if he perpetrates
the crime. If previous events of domestic violence towards his partner went
unpunished, or if he has the notion that impunity is common in femicide
cases, then he will consider this poor government intervention in situations
of IPV and femicide.
The impact of the legislation on femicide rates is difficult to address since
femicide legislation in Latin America was introduced in the last decade, and
data on femicide is annual and only available for a limited number of coun-
tries. With such limited data, there is not much variation before and after
the legislation, which presents a very low statistical power. In other words, if
we implement an econometric model, we will not detect an impact when in
fact, the impact exists. However, by looking at the trend of raw data across
years and countries, we can make a first attempt to interpret the effective-
ness of femicide laws on the number of crimes committed. Figure 5 shows
the historical data of IPV-related femicide crimes for countries with available
data and the year that the law was enacted. In some cases, like in Honduras
and Nicaragua, the law appears to have a negative effect on the number of
crimes committed, which is highlighted by the fact that femicide rates were
increasing before the enactment of the law. However, the effectiveness of the
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Figure 5. The effect of femicide legislation in Latin American countries
100
80
60
40
20
0
201620142012201020082006
Law enactment
Chile
50
40
30
20
10
0
2015201020052000
Law enactment
Costa Rica
100
80
60
40
20
0
20142012201020082006
Law enactment
Nicaragua
150
100
50
0
2015201320112009
Law enactment
Peru
600
400
200
0
20152011 20132007 20092005
Law enactment
Honduras
200
150
100
50
0
201520132011200920072005
Law enactment
Colombia
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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law seems to be ambiguous in cases like Chile and Peru, whereas in Costa Rica
the enactment of the law is followed by a considerable increase in the number
of crimes perpetrated.
4. Discussion
Legislation against IPV and femicide in Latin America represents a major
advance towards woman’s human rights and eradication of violence against
women. In Latin America, efforts to penalize femicide seem of major impor-
tance given the high overall femicide rates and femicide crimes caused by IPV.
It makes femicide a visible crime that is officially recognized and punishable,
and it guarantees women’s access to justice.
The relative novelty of these legislations and the lack of official and available
data make it difficult to measure the impact of these initiatives on femicide
crimes. From an economic point of view, and based on microeconomic and
game theory that formalizes individuals’ rational incentives and behaviors, it
seems that such laws could have a positive effect on reducing femicide crimes
by increasing the costs related to crime perpetration and therefore, affecting
the aggressor’s incentives to commit murder.
However, the concern arises when governments are incapable of implement leg-
islation effectively. The lack of response and action from the government creates
a perception of impunity among the population, which not only intensifies the
number of crimes committed by facilitating further murders, but also sends a
message to society that violence against women is both acceptable and inev-
itable (UN, 2012). In this sense, if patterns of violent behavior are normal-
ized by the inaction of authorities, there is no way to modify the aggressor’s
behavior through the law, making it useless.
In this scope, the reality in Latin America is not encouraging. For example, in
Guatemala, among all the cases of femicide reported in 2014, only 2% of them
were successfully prosecuted (Musalo, Pellegrin, and Roberts, 2014). Accord-
ing to Joseph (2012), media reported that between 2008 and 2010, there were
1.110 reported cases of femicide in Honduras, but only 211 made it to court
and 4.2% of these resulted in an actual conviction. Mexico’s conviction rate,
in turn, is of only 1.6% for those crimes that make it to court.
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Another point of discussion surrounding femicide is the possibility of the mur-
derers’ nonrational behavior. The approach proposed in this paper allowed us
to analyze how laws, punishment, and apprehension might shape criminals’
decision-making under rational assumptions. However, media often shows
femicide cases as crimes of passion that might have been driven by emotions
or nonrational choices. Walters (2015) focuses on criminal decision-making by
incorporating heuristics and cognitive biases earlier studied by Daniel Kahne-
man and Amos Tversky and proposes that criminal behavior has rational and
nonrational components. Nonrationality arises when hedonistic emotions (i.e.,
anger, frustration, excitement, or pleasure) are unmodulated by the individual
and interfere with optimal decision-making by calling for immediate action
and gratification. This leads to a type of crime called the reactive thinking
style characterized by its spontaneous, reckless, and “hot-blooded” nature.
Meanwhile, moral emotions (i.e., guilt, shame, remorse or empathy) com-
ing from the moral belief system work as regulators in preventing hedonistic
emotions to take over and, therefore, neutralizing an individual’s impulsive
criminal behavior. However, when criminals decide to ignore moral emotions
by externalizing blame for their actions or permitting themselves to commit
crime out of privilege, then the lack of moral emotions leads to purely ratio-
nal behavior and to the second type of crime called proactive thinking style.
Femicide might be the outcome of both reactive and proactive crimes; that
is, it might have both rational and nonrational components. Walters (2015)
emphasizes that just because criminal decision-making might be driven by
nonrational forces, it does not mean that criminals are absolved of responsibil-
ity. It calls for a second line of government action in crime prevention, which
is making it more difficult for individuals to neutralize moral emotions like
guilt or shame. In both reactive and proactive criminal thinking, raising moral
costs will make crime less attractive or desirable, and will lead to a decision
based on rational components that will incorporate moral feelings such as
empathy or remorse. In this sense, governments should align with gender and
social movements to increase campaigns against gender violence and female
murders. This should penetrate basic individual formation, such as early edu-
cation, by teaching young boys the moral unacceptability of violence against
women and gender-based crimes.
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5. Conclusion
Violence against women and femicide needs to be addressed from a multi-
disciplinary approach. In this paper, we evaluate the effectiveness of current
legislation against femicide from a theoretical perspective by analyzing both
the aggressor’s and the government’s behavior towards this gender-based
crime. Although severity in terms of years of imprisonment, if convicted, might
increase the costs associated with the crime for rational abusers, state inac-
tion and inefficiency to prosecute femicide cases represent an obstacle for
shaping criminal behavior.
We suggest that, for femicide legislation to have a real effect on a criminal’s
behavior, governments must commit to eradicating impunity related not only
to femicide but to the overall spectrum of violence against women. Only by
doing so, will a criminal’s perception of the probability of arrest and punish-
ment make him desist from perpetrating femicide. This could be done by train-
ing investigators, police, officers, and forensic experts properly (Joseph, 2012);
increasing campaigns and early education in the pervasion of violence against
women; and also, by balancing male and female representation in courts (see
Figure 6 for data overview of female representation in the justice system in LA).
The government should also pay attention to moral costs associated to vio-
lence against women and femicide. We have seen that, from a nonrational
perspective, moral costs help to prevent the commission of crimes arising from
hedonistic emotions such as anger or jealousy that might be present in abu-
sive relationships. Here, efforts made by the state should work as preventive
actions by educating society -especially men- about the pernicious effects of
gender-based violence and femicide. By raising overall awareness, moral costs
associated with the commission of such crimes would be more obvious for
criminals and might disrupt their hedonistic impulses and thus, change their
decision of whether to commit the crime.
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Acknowledgment
We would like to thank Professor Miguel Acosta-Andino for his guidance on
game theory.
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Figure 6. Percentage of women judges in the highest court or Supreme Court
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Argentina
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Brazil
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Colombia
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Costa Rica
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
El Salvador
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Guatemala
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Honduras
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Mexico
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Panama
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Peru
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Uruguay
50
40
30
20
10
0
2011 2013 201520092007200520032001
Venezuela
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Femicide in Latin America: An economic approach
38
desarro. soc. 88, bogo, segundo cuatrimestre de 2021, pp. 11-42, issn 0120-3584, e-issn 1900-7760, doi: 10.13043/dys.88.1
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