Regional report Arauca - Inglés - El conflicto en contexto. Un análisis en cinco regiones colombianas, 1998-2014 - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 850318278

Regional report Arauca

AutorDaniela Gómez Rivas
Cargo del AutorPolitóloga con énfasis en resolución de conflictos e investigación para la paz
Páginas593-643
CHAPTER 3
REGIONAL REPORT: ARAUCA
Daniela Gómez Rivas1
INTRODUCTION
Although the conict in Arauca was inuenced by certain critical junctures at national level2, this de-
partment faced specic circumstances that led to a dierent periodization, as described below. is type
of variation represents the multi-level nature of an extended conict such as the one experienced in
Colombia3. us, the critical junctures determined for the department of Arauca in the term within the
scope of this study are: 1998-2000, 2001-2005, 2006-2010, y 2011-2015.
Consequently, it was found that up to the end of 2000, the armed conict in Arauca was a con-
frontation between the Armed Forces and the threat of FARC-EP (Colombia’s Revolutionary Armed For-
ces, People’s Army) and the ELN (National Liberation Army), when the BVA (Arauca Conqueror’s Block)
of the self-proclaimed AUC (Colombia’s United Paramilitary Forces) came into the picture. From 2001 to
2005, the conict’s dynamic remained the same: some areas that, prior to the critical juncture, were con-
solidated by either armed group were disputed by BVA. In December 2005, BVA (of AUC) demobilized,
coinciding with an increase on the attacks of the Public Force to the guerrillas.
In 2006, FARC-EP and ELN guerillas, which up to that point fought mainly for the derived resou-
rces from oil exploitation, declared war publicly on each other, in an act of alleged connivance; this event
brought a change to the conict’s system dynamic4 in the department. In 2010, GAOIs (illegal organized
armed groups) of ELN and FARC-EP agreed a non-aggression pact, resulting from a weakened capacity
generated by the constant joint operations of the Military Forces against them, which implied an agree-
ment on the geographical distribution of the department between both armed groups. In 2011, FARC-EP
began an ongoing peace negotiation with the current government; these factors have determined the last
critical juncture.
1 Politóloga con énfasis en resolución de conictos e investigación para la paz.Autora del capítulo sobre Arauca. Coautora de
la Introducción y del capítulo 1.
2 Refer to the chapter 2, national context.
3 Refer to the chapter 1, theoretical framework.
4 Refer to the chapter 1, theoretical and methodological framework.
594 Regional report Arauca
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEPARTMENT
Geographical and Environmental Context
e geographical features of the department of Arauca is particularly important to understand the dyna-
mics and evolution of the armed conict in the region (Map 1).
e extension of the department of Arauca is of 23,818 square kilometers, it is located in the
Orinoco region, in the eastern part of the country. To the north, it limits with the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela (with the Arauca river as natural limit); to the south, with the departments of Casanare and
Vichada (divided by the Meta and Casanare rivers); to the west, with the department of Boyacá. It is divi-
ded in 7 municipalities (Arauca (the capital),
Arauquita, Cravo Norte, Fortul, Puerto Rondon, Saravena and Tame5.
ere are three morphological traits within the department: plains, mountains and foothills.
ese traits are of great importance to the armed conict in the region, its dynamic has largely depend-
ed on these geographical conditions. Cravo Norte, Fortul, Arauca, eastern Arauquita and south eastern
Tame, are located in the plains; western Fortul and Tame, and south western Saravena are located in the
mountains; central and Tame, western Arauquita, eastern Fortul and Saravena are located in the foothills.
is department’s hydrographic richness, the Orinoco’s basin, makes it strategic in terms of trans-
portation and communication, nationally and internationally. Said hydrographic network runs from west
to east through the Arauca, Casanare, Tocoragua, Tame, Cravo Norte, Ele, Lipa, San Miguel and Cinaruco
rivers. e main rivers, in terms of extension, are Arauca and Meta6.
ELN and FARC-EP guerrillas have traditionally concentrated in the mountains and the foothills,
where they found certain degree of consolidation. eir military strategy7, although changing, allowed
them to become skilled on troops mobilization and in combat in those areas throughout the years. On the
other hand, AUC achieved larger control of the plains8.
e Risk Reports issued by the Ombudsman’s Oce SAT (Early Alert System) contain details on
the resources considered important by the GAOI, in the form of strategic corridors for dierent types of
trac and movement (guns, troops, logistic material, drug trac or connection between departments) or
as a border strip for illicit activities (consumables trac, drug trac, etc.)
e department’s main strategic corridors are distributed as follows: there are strategic road axels
in the municipality of Tame, which connect the department with the interior of the country9. e mu-
nicipality of Puerto Rondón has adequate conditions for combat strategies and tactics by illegal organized
armed groups, for instance, communication with the eastern block or oensive barriers against illegal
paramilitary groups, as well as provisioning, mobility and conquering land from the latter10. Likewise, the
Casanare, Cravo and Meta rivers are important waterways and communications axles between rural and
urban areas in these territories, since most roads can be transited only in the summer or dry season11.
In terms of population control, illicit crops, laboratories and drug tracking, the municipality of
Arauquita can be sub-divided in 4 strategic zones: Panama de Arauca and La Esmeralda (illicit crops); the
road between La Pesquera and La Esmeralda (guerrillas corridor); the stretch of the Arauca river between
Puerto Lleras and Los Angelitos (illegal trac of several types); and nally, the urban area of Arauquita
(administrative center) 12.
5 Gobernación de Arauca, 2015.
6 Gobernación de Arauca, 2004.
7 Refer to Section 2 in this report.
8 Hereinaer are presented in detail the characteristics of the GAOI and its presence in the department.
9 Defensoría del Pueblo, SAT: Informe de Riesgo N° 062-05, 2005.
10 Defensoría del Pueblo, SAT: Informe de Riesgo N° 049-05, 2005.
11 Ibíd.
12 Defensoría del Pueblo, SAT: Informe de Riesgo N.° 071-04, 2004.
Regional report Arauca 595
Similarly, there are four strategic areas for the illegal organized armed groups in the municipality of
Arauca. First, the road Corocoro - Bocas del Ele - rio Ele - rio Cravo and the surrounding townships to-
wards southern Arauca (mobility corridor, extortion). Second, dierent spots in the road from Arauca to
the municipalities of Arauquita and Saravena (oil plays, access route to other regions of interest). ird,
eastern Arauca (mobility corridor, border access). Lastly, the urban area of the municipality (extortion,
pressure on public authorities)13.
Sociodemographic Context
Settling Dynamics: Background for the Sociodemographic Analysis
e focalized and spontaneous colonization processes that took place in the 20th century in Arauca ma-
nifest as complex processes. ey date back to 1926, when the road Labateca -rio Sarare was opened; to
the 40’s and 50’s and the violence that displaced many to the interior of the country; to the 60’s and 70’s,
when INCORA (Colombian Institute for Agricultural Reform) led a colonization process that overew
and originated spontaneous colonization processes. e latter, as Giraldo says14, were a manifestation
of the country’s political leaders’ denial to conduct an agricultural reform. us, said colonization pro-
cesses by the peasants took place in the mountains and foothills, which the central government consi-
dered barren land, based on properties that did not exceed 40 hectares, constituted as smallholdings or
middle-sized properties15. On the contrary, the plains, populated since the colony (although with few
inhabitants), had large estates, in which “overall, it was dicult to dene its limits or count cattle heads
that belonged to the landowner”16.
e last spontaneous colonization process in record came in the 80’s, when the Caño Limon
oil play was discovered, and it occupied the non-populated rural area of the municipalities of Arauca
and Arauquita. Although said process may not be considered colonization, seeing as the settlement in
these municipalities started long ago, and most population-increase dynamics are supposedly concen-
trated in urban areas, the empirical verication of this dynamic, based on eld work in the area, lead
to a dierent reality: the regulations of oil production plays, such as Caño Limon and Caricare, forced
oil companies to hire labor from the areas of inuence, and in the case of Arauca and Arauquita it is
mostly rural. Consequently, most of the peasants who arrived and settled in the area aer the 80’s, did
so on properties that were not legalized, drawn by the possibility of nding employment in the plays.
Migration to the two main urban centers of these municipalities, although no less important, shows
dierent characteristics, since it is represented by highly qualied urban population and peasants dis-
placed by violence in the 90’s and 2000.
GAOI have taken advantage of the idiosyncrasies arising from the territorial configura-
tions of the different colonization processes, they have leveraged them to build their social bases.
The savannah, with its large, cattle estates, were an important enclave for AUC, who seemingly
shared an agenda with the interests of landowners. AUC also managed to settle in the peasant
foothill areas, where coca crops were predominant. On the other hand, the agenda of GAOI ELN
and FARC gave them more acceptance, allowing them to settle in the foothills and mountains,
characterized by the small and medium-sized property and mostly inhabited by peasants. By the
end of the 90’s, resulting from a change in Venezuela’s government, the insurgency consolidates its
13 Defensoría del Pueblo, SAT: Informe de Riesgo N.° 012-05, 2005.
14 Giraldo, 2006.
15 Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo Social e IICA, 1995.
16 El tiempo, 2002, 3 de noviembre.

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