Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector and non-Ricardian Agents
| Autor | Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez, Santiago Téllez |
| Páginas | 33-69 |
33
D E S A R R O . S O C . 71, P R I M E R S E M E S T R E D E 2013, P P . X-X X , I S S N 0120-3584
Revista
Desarrollo y Sociedad
73
Primer semestre 2014
PP. 33-69, ISSN 0120-3584
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil
Sector and non-Ricardian Agents1
Política fiscal en una economía pequeña
y abierta con un sector de petróleo y agentes
no-Ricardianos
Andrés González2, Martha López3,
Norberto Rodríguez4, Santiago Téllez5
DOI: 10.13043/DYS.73.2
Abstract
In this paper we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium fiscal model for
the Colombian economy. The model has three main components: the existence of
non-Ricardian households, price and wage rigidities, and a fiscal authority that
finances government spending partly with public debt. The model is calibrated
to capture the empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of government
spending and it is used to study the effect of an oil price shock under differ-
ent fiscal policy rules. Our results show that fiscal multipliers in Colombia are
1 We thank Hernando Vargas, Eduardo Sarmiento Gómez, Jesus A. Bejarano and Sergio Ocampo for com-
ments on earlier drafts. We also thank Guilherme de Almeida Bandeira for early research assistance
in the model. The views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not represent those of
the Banco de la República or its Board of Directors.
2 Associate Professor, Universidad de los Andes.
3 Researcher, Research Unit, Banco de la República, corresponding author, mlopezpi@banrep.gov.co.
4 Principal Econometrician, Department of Macroeconomic Models, Banco de la República.
5 Economist, Department of Macroeconomic Models, Banco de la República.
Este artículo fue recibido el 18 de febrero de 2013; revisado el 3 de septiembre de 2013 y, finalmente,
aceptado el 14 de abril de 2014.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
34
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
positive in a way consistent with the evidence. Our analysis also shows that
a structural fiscal rule delivers a better outcome in terms of macroeconomic
volatility relative to a balanced budget rule or a countercyclical fiscal rule.
Key words: Fiscal multipliers, fiscal policy rules, non-Ricardian households,
DSGE model.
JEL classification: D91, E21, E62.
Resumen
En este artículo planteamos un modelo fiscal de equilibrio general dinámico y
estocástico para la economía colombiana. El modelo tiene tres componentes
principales: a) la existencia de hogares no-Ricardianos, b) rigideces de precios
y salarios y c) una autoridad fiscal que financia su gasto en parte con deuda
pública. El modelo se calibra para capturar la evidencia empírica de los efec-
tos macroeconómicos del gasto del gobierno y a su vez es usado para estudiar
el efecto de un choque de precios del petróleo con diferentes reglas de polí-
tica fiscal. Nuestros resultados muestran que los multiplicadores del gasto en
Colombia son positivos de acuerdo con la evidencia. Nuestro análisis también
muestra que en términos de disminución de la volatilidad macroeconómica,
una regla fiscal estructural es preferible a una regla de presupuesto balan-
ceado o una regla fiscal contracíclica.
Palabras clave: multiplicadores fiscales, reglas de política fiscal, hogares no-
Ricardianos, modelo DSGE.
Clasificación JEL: D91, E21, E62.
Introduction
Macroeconomic stability is one of the key ingredients to enhance economic
growth. Nonetheless, the development of a more integrated world during the
last couple of decades has put forward the need to introduce more instru-
ments to achieve this elusive goal. In this sense, not only monetary policy has
a role but also fiscal policy has gain relevance as an important element for
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 35
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
overcoming macroeconomic instability. This is true for both developed and
emerging market countries.
In the particular case of small open economies characterized by endowments
of natural resources, such as oil, very often their economies are affected by
shocks that result not only in the so called Dutch disease but also in economic
volatility. Another characteristic that might reinforce this instability, in some
of these economies, is the presence of great proportion of agents that do not
have access to capital markets to smooth consumption (non-Ricardian agents).
These consumers, who receive transfers coming from higher oil revenues, con-
sume all their disposable income period by period, which contributes to mac-
roeconomic volatility.
Colombia is one example of this kind of small open economies with a signifi-
cant size of credit constraint households and oil revenues. Even though its GDP
has been growing at a positive rate, the economy as a whole has showed high
economic instability since 2004. The rise in oil prices during the last decade
resulted in large capital inflows coming from foreign direct investment (FDI) as
a percentage of GDP (particularly in the oil sector). FDI increased 4.0% between
2004 and 2011 compared to 2.2% between 1993 and 2003 (Garavito, Iregui
and Ramírez, 2012). The exchange rate presented a real appreciation of 30%
between 2004 and 2011. The ratio of credit to GDP increased from 46.1% in
2004 to 67.7% in 2008. Something similar occurred with asset prices, whose
real index went from 140.0 to 416.4 in the same period. Finally, economic
growth went from 3.5% in 2005 to 7.5% in 2007 and slowed down to 0.1%
during 2009; but the bubble remerged fueled by capital inflows in 2011.
The fiscal authority might have a tool to contribute in stabilizing the busi-
ness cycle: a fiscal rule that saves part of oil revenues during booms and that
spends excess revenues during bad times may reduce output volatility. As we
will show in the paper, a fiscal policy rule enables the government to smooth
consumption of non-Ricardian agents dampening the business cycle. In addi-
tion, these rules constitute another instrument, besides the policy interest rate,
that allows policy-makers to achieve macroeconomic stability.
In order to be able to evaluate different fiscal rules, first we need to develop
a fiscal model that describes important aspects of the Colombian economy. In
particular, the model should capture the fact that in Colombia (like in many
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
36
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
other countries) consumption increases after a government spending shock. In
this paper we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium fiscal model
for the Colombian economy that replicates this fact. The model has three main
components: the existence of non-Ricardian households, price and wage rigid-
ities, and a fiscal authority that finances public spending partly with public
debt and partly with taxes and oil revenues (see Colciago, 2011; Galí, López-
Salido and Vallés, 2007; Monacelli and Perotti, 2010). The intuition behind this
set up is clear. Introducing non-Ricardian agents is equivalent to making part
of the aggregate demand independent of the real interest rate which allows
these consumers to overcome wealth effects. A necessary condition for pri-
vate consumption to increase is for the real wage to increase. At the same
time, a positive response of real wage requires labor demand to shift out. This
happens in our model because of rigidities in price setting by monopolistically
competing firms: “When government spending increases, firms face an out-
ward shift in the demand curve for the variety they produce; those firms that
cannot change their prices meet this extra demand by increasing production,
hence shifting out the derived demand for labor” (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008).
In addition, if the government finances government spending partially with
public debt, consumption of non-Ricardian consumers will not fall as long as
taxes are collected sufficiently slowly.
The objective of the paper is to use the model to show how the Colombian
economy would benefit in terms of welfare and less macroeconomic volatil-
ity if the government decides to use a fiscal rule that saves part of the oil
revenues in the form of reduced debt. This kind of fiscal rule is known as a
Structural Surplus Rule (SSR) and has been implemented in countries like
Chile and Norway (see Pieschacón, 2012). We compare this rule with a bench-
mark rule called a Balanced Budget Rule (BBR), which is highly procyclical in
terms of increasing government spending when there are excess revenues of
oil. This benchmark rule resembles very much what has been the fiscal policy
in Colombia with respect to the government´s management of oil revenues
until now (see Lozano and Toro, 2007). As a complement, we also analyze
what happens if the government decides to implement a countercyclical rule
(CCR) in which the policy instruments represent strong automatic stabilizers.
In addition, we analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy
in terms of welfare. We want to answer if the implementation of a SSR con-
tributes to a less aggressive monetary policy stance when the economy faces
a shock in oil prices.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 37
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Moreover, the data strongly suggests the growing importance of the oil sec-
tor in recent years in Colombia. As we can see in figure 1, oil prices increased
notoriously and oil production as a percentage of GDP has increased since
2002. Exports to GDP ratio achieved a level of 8.6 percent in 2012. And more
importantly, government´s oil revenues reached a 19.3 percent of total rev-
enues in 2011.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section one presents empirical
evidence on the effects of government spending in the Colombian economy.
Section two describes the model. In section three the parameter values are
discussed. Section four provides the simulations of the model to shocks in
government spending and to oil prices as well as welfare analysis for the dif-
ferent kind of rules. Finally, section five concludes.
I. Empirical Evidence
In this section we document the effects of government spending shocks on key
macroeconomic variables. Following Vargas, Gonzalez and Lozano (2012) we
identify the government spending shock with a method that meets the criteria
of no anticipation and no contemporaneous correlation with output. To do so,
we define the shock as the difference between the Central Government actual
primary expenditures (overall spending without interest payments on public
debt) and the forecast made of this variable. Next we consider the effect of
the shock in a VAR. We use quarterly data for the 1999 to 2011 period. In order
to examine the effect on a number of variables, without including too many
variables in the VAR, we follow Ramey (2011) s’ strategy of using a fixed set
of variables and rotating other variables of interest. The fix set of variables
consists of the no anticipated spending shock, the log of real per capita gov-
ernment spending, and the log of real per capita GDP. The series of variables
that we rotate, one at a time, are private consumer expenditure, total hours,
real wage, real exchange rate and net exports as percentage of GDP. Four lags
of the variables and a linear trend are used.
Figure 2 shows the results. The impulse responses to a shock in the no
anticipated government spending shock have been normalized so that the
response of government spending is equal to one. Besides, to obtain the
implied government spending multiplier, we use the corresponding ratio of
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
38
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Figure 1. Stylized Facts About the Oil Sector in Colombia
Source: López, Montes, Garavito and Collazos (2012).
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 39
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
GDP to government spending, 6.7 during the period. We report 68% confidence
intervals as used commonly in this kind of studies. In response to the fiscal
expansion, we observe an increase in both output and consumption peaking
three quarters after the shock. The peak of the implied government spending
multiplier ranges between 0.7 and 1.8. This range is in line with a study by
Blanchard and Leigh (2013) for the IMF. Their estimates of fiscal multipliers
for other economies have been between 0.9 and 1.7. The increase in private
consumption is also in line with many other SVAR studies on the effects of
government spending. See, for example, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007)
and Mountford and Uhlig (2009). The size in consumption multiplier points to
the importance of that variable in the effect of government spending on out-
put, suggesting the presence of non-Ricardian effects. In addition, cumulative
multiplier reaches a value of 3.3 at a four quarter horizon. The empirical evi-
dence is similar to that found by Lozano and Rodríguez (2011) and Restrepo
and Rincón (2006) for the case of Colombia.
Figure 2 also shows that real wage increases in response to the shock. The
effect on total hours is ambiguous; the expansion in public spending results
in deterioration in the current account and the real exchange rate appreci-
ates. Other studies also find this kind of results for other economies, see, for
example, Monacelli and Perotti (2010), Ravn et al. (2007) and Ramey (2011).
II. Model
This section presents a model that replicates most of the empirical evidence
presented in the previous section and that can be used for fiscal policy analy-
sis regarding fiscal policy rules when the economy is facing oil prices shocks.
The model developed is along the lines of Galí et al. (2007) and Kumhof and
Laxton (2009). From the Galí et al. (2007)’s approach, our model shares that it
is a DSGE New Keynesian model with non-Ricardian agents which suits very
well the Colombian economy given the high proportion of credit constraint
households in the economy (near 80 per cent according with our calculations).
From the Kumhof and Laxton (2009)’s approach we take into account how
they model the different fiscal policy rules. Some additional characteristics of
the model, specific to the Colombian economy, are that we take into account
that we are dealing with a small open economy and that we have oil income
as an important source of government revenue.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
40
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Figure 2. Responses to an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
048 12 16 20
GDP response
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
048 12 16 20 24
Hours
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
048 12 16 20 24
Real exchange rate
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 41
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Figure 2. Responses to an Unanticipated Government Spending Shock (continued)
8
4
0 0
0 4
0 8
1 2
1 6
2 0
2 4
048 12 16 20 24
Consumption
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
048 12 16 20 24
Real wages
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
048 12 16 20 24
nx /GDP
Source: Author´s calculations.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
42
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
A. Households
We assume that there is a fraction of Non-Ricardian households in the
economy whose variables are denoted by N and a fraction
1−
()
Γ
of Ricard-
ian agents whose variables are denoted by R. The utility function of house-
holds is non-separable between consumption and labor.
1. Ricardian Households
Ricardian Households, denoted by R, are indexed between and 1 and have
preferences of the form
Ec
n
t
t
R
Rt R
RtR
R
r
R
0
=0
,
,
11
1
11
1
1
∞+−
∑−−+
−−
bqg
g
where
cRt,
is a consumption index and
nRt,
are hours worked. The parameter
R
measures the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
qR
is a scale param-
eter and
gR
the inverse of the Frisch elasticity. This kind of preferences was
introduced by Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman(1988) (GHH) and have the
property that the wealth effect on labor supply is muted. As we will see in the
results, GHH preferences and price rigidities allow the increase of consump-
tion as a response to an increase in government spending. The term outside
the braquet corresponds to part of the CRRA utility function.
These households maximize utility subject to two constraints. First their bud-
get constraint is given by
11 =
,, ,,,,
+
()
+−
()
++∗∗
tt
ct Rt xt
t
x
t
cRt Rt
tt
t
cRt
cp
pxbep
pb
11 1
1
,,,,,1 ,1 1
−
()
+−
()
++
+
−− −
tt
nt Rt Rt kt t
k
Rt Rt
t
t
c
wn rk bi++ +
+
+
−+
+
∗
−
∗−
∗
∗
ep
pbi
T
tt
t
cRt
t
t
tRt
h
t
,1 1
1
1
1
1
w
Γ
The left hand side of the equation represents purchases in consumption includ-
ing taxes, after subsidy net investment, and purchases of domestic and foreign
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 43
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
assets, where following Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003), the foreign interest
rate
ii ep
p
b
gdp b
tb
tt
t
c
t
t
∗∗∗∗
−
−=1exp
, depends on the country’s net foreign
asset position,
bt
*
as a percentage of GDP, the real exchange rate
ep
p
tt
t
c
∗
and an
exogenous risk premium shock,
b
. The terms in the right hand side represent
sources of income including after tax labor income, after tax holdings of capi-
tal, domestic nominal discount bonds issued by the government, foreign bonds
holdings, profits from unions and intermediate firms,
w
tR
and
t
h
, respectively,
and lump-sum net transfers.
The second constraint is given by the capital accumulation equation
kx x
xk
Rt Rt
Rt
Rt
Rt,,
,
,1
2
,1
=1
211−−
+−
()
−
−
where the investment, xt, exhibits adjustment costs.
2. Non-Ricardian Households
Non-Ricardian Households, denoted by N, are indexed between 0 and and
solve a similar problem but they are assumed to have no access to financial
markets. Therefore, they consume period by period all their labor income and
the transfers received from the government. They seek to maximize their life-
time utility
Ec
n
t
t
N
Nt N
NtN
N
n
N
0
=0
,
,
11
1
11
1
1
∞+−
∑−−+
−−
bqg
g
subject to the budget constraint
1=11
,, ,,,
+
()
−
()
++tt w
ct Nt nt Nt Nt tNt
cwnT
Γ
where the left hand side corresponds to after tax consumption and the right hand
side to after tax labor income, dividends from unions and lump sum transfers.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
44
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
B. Domestic and Imported Consumption and Investment
It is assumed that the composition of the consumption bundle is identical for
both types of households; therefore we will not use the subindex for house-
hold type. The consumption bundle takes the form
ccc
tc
ct
hc
ccct
fc
c
c
c
=1 11111
−
()
()
+
()
−−
−
aa
(1)
where ct is a CES index that includes domestic and foreign goods, with param-
eter
ac
determining the degree of openness and
c
the elasticity of substi-
tution between domestic and imported goods. The lagrange multiplier,
pt
c
,
denotes the consumption price index that normalizes every price index of the
economy as follows
ppp
t
c
ct
hc
ct
fcc
=1 11
1
1
−
()
()
+
()
−−
−
aa
As for consumption, the investment bundle xt aggregates domestic and for-
eign investment according to the next function
xxx
tx
xt
hx
xxxt
fx
x
x
x
=1 ,
11111
−
()
()
+
()
−−
−
aa
(2)
here the Lagrange multiplier,
pt
x
, indicates the investment price index. The
investment good relative price is given by
p
p
p
p
p
p
t
x
t
cx
t
h
t
c
x
x
t
f
t
c
x
=1
11
1
1
−
()
+
−−
aa
−−x
where
ax
represent the participation of foreign goods in investment and
x
is
the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign investment goods.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 45
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
C. Labor Agencies, Unions and Wage Setting
In order to introduce nominal rigidities in wages and to facilitate the aggre-
gation, we expand the framework of Kumhof and Laxton (2009). The setup
is as follows: Ricardian and non-Ricardian households sell labor to specific
Ricardian and non-Ricardian unions respectively that differentiates it. Since
they produce differentiated labor, these unions have monopolistic power. After
buying labor from the households, the differentiated labor is sold to Ricardian
and non-Ricardian agencies in perfect competition that “pack” the labor into
composites of Ricardian and non-Ricardian labor respectively. Finally, both
types of “packed” labor are bought by a national agency that aggregates them
into a final composite to be sold to intermediate good firms.
1. Labor Agencies
As mentioned before, there are three types of labor agencies: Non-Ricard-
ian, Ricardian and aggregate labor agency. The first two are identical and are
designed to buy the differenciated labor from Ricardian,
uRt,
, and non-Ri-
cardian,
uNt,
, unions to aggregate into Ricardian and non-Ricardian indexes.
The national labor agency aggregates Ricardian and non-Ricardian labor
“packed” by specific labor agencies and sells it to intermediate good firms
subject to a CES aggregator
nuu
th
hnt
h
hhhrt
h
h
h
h
=1 1
,
11
,
11
−
()
()
+
()
−−
−
aa
(3)
so that the demand for “packed” Ricardian and non-Ricardian labor are given
by
uv
vn
Nt h
Nt
t
h
t,
,
=1−
()
−
a
(4)
uv
vn
Rt h
Rt
t
h
t,
,
=a
−
(5)
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
46
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
with the Lagrange multiplier equal to vt
v
p
v
p
v
p
t
t
ch
Nt
t
c
h
h
Rt
t
c
h
=1 ,
1
,
11
−
()
+
−−
aa
11−h
where
v
p
t
t
c
stands for the real wage paid by the intermediate good firms as
shown below.
Non-Ricardian labor agency demands labor from union j given the aggregate
labor agency’s demand and the aggregation function
uu dj
Nt Njt
n
n
n
n
,0
1
,,
11
=∫
()
−−
qw
qw
qw
qw
Thus, the demand for labor from union j is given by
uv
vu
Njt
Njt
Nt
n
Nt,,
,,
,
,
=
−qw
(6)
where
unt,
is the labor demanded by the national agency in equation (4). The
corresponding wage index is
vvdj
Nt Njt
NN
,0
1
,,
1
1
1
=∫−−
qwqw
Aggregating over unions, we obtain the aggregate labor supplied by non-Ri-
cardian households
Γϒnu
Nt tNNt,,
=w
(7)
where
ϒtnNjt
Nt
N
v
vdj
w
qw
≡
∫
−
0
1,,
,
.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 47
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
In the same way, there is a Ricardian Labor Agency that solves a similar prob-
lem with respect to the labor supplied by Ricardian labor Unions.
2. Labor Unions
There is a continuum of unions
j∈
[]
0,1
that buy labor from non-Ricardian
Households at wN,t and sell it to the non-Ricardian labor agency at
vNjt,,
. They
have monopolistic power and can set
vNjt,,
optimally with probability
1−
()
wN
each period. Between re-optimization periods we allow the nominal wage to
be adjusted according to the following indexation rule
vv v
Njti Njti ti
c
Njt
s
i
ts
c
,, ,, 11,,
=1
1
=1=1
++−+−+−
+
()
+
()
∏
Every union j maximizes benefits subject to this indexation rule and the demand
from the non-Ricardian labor agency given by (6).
As for labor agencies, the Ricardian unions solve a similar problem to that of
non-Ricardian unions.
D. Domestic Good Firms
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms producing dif-
ferentiated intermediate goods. The latter are used as inputs by a (perfectly
competitive) firm producing a single final good.
E. Final Good Firms
The final good is produced by a representative, perfectly competitive firm with
a constant returns technology
yydz
t
h
zt
h
h
h
h
h
=0
1
,
11
∫
()
−−
q
q
q
q
where
yzt
h
,
is the quantity of intermediate good z used as an input and
qh>1
.
Profit maximization, taking as given the final goods price
pt
h
and the prices for
the intermediate goods
pzt
h
,
, all
z∈[0,1]
, yields the set of demand schedules
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
48
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
yp
py
zt
hzt
h
t
h
h
t
h
,
,
=
−q
as well as the price index
ppdz
t
h
zt
hhh
=0
1
,
1
1
1
∫
()
−−
qq
F. Intermediate Good Firms
There is a continuum of intermediate good firms,
z∈
[]
0,1
, with technology
described by
yAkn
zt
h
tztzt,,1,
1
=−−aa
(8)
where
kn
zt zt,,
and
represent the capital and labor services hired by firm z.
Firms minimize cost subject to (8). The resulting real marginal cost is (note
that because all firms have the same cost, we drop the z index)
jaa
a
a
t
t
t
k
t
t
c
z
r
v
p
=1
1
1
−
−
()
G. Optimal Price-Setting
Intermediate firms are assumed to set nominal prices according to the sto-
chastic time dependent rule proposed by Calvo (1983). Each firm resets its
price with probability
1−h
each period, independently of the time elapsed
since the last adjustment, setting price
pz
h
. In absence of reoptimization, the
firm follows an updating rule
pp p
zt i
h
zt i
h
t
h
zt
h
s
i
ts
h
,,11,
=1
1
=1=1
++−− +−
+
()
+
()
∏
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 49
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
H. Government
1. Monetary Policy
Monetary policy follows a conventional simple policy rule where interest rate
is set by the Central Bank according with
1= 1
+
{}
+
ii
t
t
c
t
i
1+
exp
(9)
where long-run interest rate is
i
, the inflation target is
and the feed-back
parameter (the response of the policy interest rate to deviation of inflation
from target) is
.
2. Fiscal Policy
The government purchases both domestic and foreign goods. These purchases
are assumed to have null effect on private utility or productivity. Again, the
government bundle of goods Gt is a CES aggregator of domestic and imported
government purchased goods
GGG
tG
Gt
hG
GGGt
fG
G
G
G
=1 11111
−
()
()
+
()
−−
−
aa
(10)
with the Lagrange multiplier equal to
pt
G
. The government goods relative prices
are given by
p
p
p
p
p
p
t
G
t
cG
t
h
t
c
G
G
t
f
t
c
G
=1
11
1
1
−
()
+
−−
aa
−−G
(11)
where
aG
represent the participation of foreign goods in government spend-
ing and
G
is the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign gov-
ernment goods.
In addition, the government taxes consumption, labor income and capital,
subsidizes investment, transfers resources to Non-Ricardian and Ricardian
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
50
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
households and issues debt in the domestic economy. The government bud-
get constraint takes the following form
bibs
t
t
t
ctt
=1
1
11
+
+
−
−−
(12)
sp
pyggdp T
tt
t
oil
t
ct
oil
ttt
=,tw+−−
(13)
where st is the primary surplus and
tt
denotes the total tax revenues, the
international price of oil
pt
oil*
is assumed to follow an exogenous autorre-
gresive process, implying a domestic oil price
pep
pp
t
oiltt
t
ct
oil
=
**
; in the same
way, oil production
yt
oil
is assumed to be exogenous. w denotes the share of
oil production that the government owns, so that a fraction w of oil revenues
accrues to the government, whereas the remaining share of oil revenues go
to foreign companies. The term
gp
p
G
gdp
t
t
G
t
c
t
t
≡
represents goverment spend-
ing as a percentage of GDP, and Tt lump-sum net transfers.
Total tax revenues correspond to collected taxes on consumption, capital and
labor income minus subsidy on investment
tt ttt
tntNtNtRtRtktt
k
tctt xt t
wn wn rk cx=1
,,,,,, ,,
ΓΓ+−
()
()
++−
(14)
Government surplus
gst
is defined as
gs bb
tt
t
t
=1
11
−+ +
−
(15)
which equals the primary surplus and net interest payments on government
debt. The share of government expenditure to real GDP of the economy, gt, is
assumed to follow an exogenous and autorregresive process
ggg
tGGt Gt
=1 ,
1,
−
()
++
−
(16)
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 51
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
where
g
is the long run government share and
G
captures the persistence
of the process.
Similarly, tax rates on wages, consumption, holdings of capital and the invest-
ment subsidy are allowed to vary according to
ttt
tt tit iiiit it,,1,
=1−
()
++
−
(17)
where
ti
corresponds to
tttt
wkcx
,, and
: the long-run tax rates,
ti
corre-
sponds to
tttt
wkcx
,, and
which represent persistency and
ti
corre-
sponds to
ttt
wkc
,,
and
tx
which are i.i.d. white noise shocks.
The final component of fiscal policy is the policy rule that is explained in the
next section.
I. Fiscal Policy Rules
A general form of fiscal policy rule has the form
gs
gdp gs dgdp gdp dp
p
y
gdp
t
t
rat
tax
t
t
oil
t
oil
t
c
t
oil
t
=+−
+
ttw−−
+−
p
p
y
gdp
db
gdp
b
gdp
oil
c
oil
debt
t
t
where
gsrat
is a structural surplus target. In Colombia in July 2011 was intro-
duced a fiscal rule where the structural surplus target for the year 2014 is
-2.3%. The remaining items correspond to cyclical adjustments according to
excess tax revenue, excess revenue from mining sector and an additional debt
gap variable.
When
ddd
taxoil debt
== =0
holds, the rule corresponds to a strict Balanced
Budget Rule (BBR) that is highly procyclical because it calls for higher spend-
ing in a boom. This has been the case in Colombia during the last decade.
The case of parameter values of
dd
taxoil
==1
and
ddebt =0
corresponds to
a Structural Surplus Rule (SSR) where the rule ties government spending to
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
52
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
structural/permanent government revenues. This kind of rule has been used
in countries like Chile (see Céspedes Fornero and Galí, 2012) and Norway (see
Pieschacón, 2012). In this case, as mentioned before, total government spend-
ing (including interest payments) plus a time varying “surplus target” must
be equal to structural revenues. In this rule, excess revenues from oil or tax
revenue are saved in the form of reduced debt or increased assets. Accord-
ing to Céspedes et al. (2012), in the case of Chile “the idea was to acknowl-
edge that public debt was at a level higher that was considered appropriate
for a small open economy that faced exogenous credit constraint shocks and
a given potential future pension liabilities”. The structural surplus target,
gsrat
,
is exogenous. As pointed out by Kumhof and Laxton (2009), this rule has at
least two important implications. First, it has the ability to stabilize long-run
debt. Equation (15) shows that a SSR anchors the long-run debt to GDP ratio,
bgs g
g
rat
rat
=41
−−
, which in the case of Colombia with a nominal growth
rate
g
of 5 percent and surplus target of -2.3 percent of GDP would imply
a long-run debt to GDP ratio of about 12 percent compared to the actual 30
percent level. The second implication is related to the business cycle stabili-
zation and volatility of fiscal instruments. We will discuss this aspect in the
results of the simulations of the model.
In the other extreme we have a countercyclical fiscal rule. This kind of rule
corresponds to the case of a parameter value of
dtax>1
which calls for higher
tax rate (or lower spending) in a boom. This rule would represent strong auto-
matic stabilizers, such as progressive taxation or countercyclical transfers, for
example unemployment insurance (Kumhof and Laxton, 2009).
In order to achieve objective of the targeting rule the fiscal authority has six
instruments, three taxes
tt t
ct lt kt,, ,
, and
, a subsidy
txt,
and two spending
items Tt and Gt. The default instrument for our baseline results is transfers Tt . In
this case, the fiscal rule is given by
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 53
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
T
gdp
T
gdp dgdp gdp
t
t
tax
t
t
−
−−
=(1)
tt
+− −
(1 )dp
p
y
gdp
p
p
y
gdp
oil
t
oil
t
c
t
oil
t
oil
c
oil
w
−−
db
gdp
b
gdp
debt
t
t
(18)
where the overlined variables denote their steady state values, so that the
fiscal rule activates when the variables of interest of the government devi-
ate from their steady state values and
T
has been set to satisfy the structural
surplus budget.
J. Rest of the World
Foreign demand of home produced goods
ct
h*
is given by
cp
p
ep
pc
t
ht
h
t
c
tt
c
t
t
∗
−−
∗
=
1
m
(19)
where the parameter m represents the price elasticity of exports.
K. Equilibrium and Aggregation
Market clearing condition for capital, given that only Ricardian agents engage
in capital accumulation is given by
kk
tRt
=1 ,
−
()
Γ
(20)
Similarly for other asset holdings we have
bb
tRt
=1 ,
−
()
Γ
(21)
bb
tRt
*
,
*
=1−
()
Γ
(22)
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
54
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Agregate consuption and investment are
cc c
tNtRt
=1
,,
ΓΓ+−
()
(23)
xx
tRt
=1 ,
−
()
Γ
(24)
Domestic uses of product
ycxGc
t
h
t
h
t
h
t
h
t
h
=+++∗
(25)
Finally real GDP is
gdp p
pyp
py
t
h
t
ct
ht
oil
t
ct
oil
=+
(26)
L. Aggregate Welfare
Making use of the cashless limit assumption, the period utility of representa-
tive l household at time t is given by
Vc
nlNR
t
l
N
lt l
lt l
l
l
l
=1
11
1
1
,
,
11
−−+
−−=
+−
qg
g
,,
The expectation of welfare is
WV W
t
l
t
l
t
l
=1
++
b
(27)
In order to have a metric for the welfare gain if Colombia could switch from
the BBR that follows until now to a SSR like the one in Chile or Norway, we
compute the welfare gain
Ωl
as
bl
t
lfisc
t
lBBR
EW EW=100 1 1, ,
−−
()
()
−
e
where
EWt
lfisc,
is the expectation on welfare under a given combination of fiscal
rule parameters and
EWt
lBBR,
is the expectation of welfare under the baseline
combination, the BBR. We use second order approximation of the first order
conditions of the model and the utility functions to compute welfare.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 55
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Finally, we quantify aggregate welfare by way of population-weighted aver-
age of welfare gains
=(1)−+ΓΓ
RN
(28)
III. Calibration
In this section we present the calibration of the model for the Colombian econ-
omy. The subjective discount factor b is set to 0.99, implying a steady state
interest rate of 4%. The parameter w is consistent with the government’s share
on total mining sector dividends, which corresponds to the share of govern-
ment in state firm Ecopetrol. The long-run values
t
are in line with estimates
by Fergusson (2003) and Hamann, Lozano and Mejía (2011). The long-run ratio
of government expenditure to GDP
g
is 0.15 according with the data.
We also calibrated the Calvo price probability,
h
, in 0.7 according with esti-
mates for Colombia by Bejarano (2005) which is also in line with estimates for
the United States by Smets and Wouters (2007). The Calvo wage probability
was calibrated in 0.4 for Ricardian agents in line with estimates for Colombia
by Bonaldi, González and Rodríguez (2011), and we assumed low wage rigid-
ity for the non-Ricardian agents.
For the parameter , share of non-Ricardian agents in the Colombian econ-
omy, we use a Superfinanciera (the banking supervision agency in Colombia)
dataset recorded by each bank in the 341 form about credit card holders as a
percentage of the population in working age reported by DANE (the Colom-
bian Statistics Department): 20%. This parameter value is also consistent with
Prada and Rojas (2009) who found that informal labor in Colombia is about
70% of total labor. This parameter value is similar also to the one estimated
for the Chilean economy by Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991).
The elasticity of substitution among varieties of intermediate goods,
qh
, is
calibrated in 6 which implies a steady-state mark-up of 20 per cent, a com-
mon value used in the literature. The inverse of Frisch elasticity was calibrated
in 0.5 according with Prada and Rojas (2009). The investment cost parame-
ter, , is set at 0.5 as estimated by López, Prada and Rodríguez(2009) for the
Colombian economy.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
56
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
The elasticity of country risk premium with respect to net foreign debt,
b
, is
set equal to 0.0024, which as pointed out by Gertler, Gilchrist and Natalucci
(2003) should be small enough so that the friction in the capital market does
not alter the high frequency model dynamics but nonetheless makes net for-
eign indebtedness revert to trend.
The elasticity of output to capital, a, is set to 0.3 to be consistent with the
labor income share. The relative risk aversion coefficient,
R
, was set at 2.0
according with estimates by López (2001). We fix the steady state world interest
rate at 3 per cent per annum. The steady state foreign and domestic inflation
rates are set at 3 per cent per annum. Table 1 summarizes all the parameters
and their description. Finally, table 2 presents the different long run ratios
used for the calibration along with their observed values in the data, their
equivalent in the model and the corresponding percentage deviation. As can
be observed, the maximum percentage deviation is 3.5%.
Table 1. Parameter Values
Parameter Value Description
b0.99 Intertemporal discount factor
0.8 Share of Non-Ricardian on total population
gj
0.5 Inverse of Frisch elasticity
qj
4 Labor supply scale parameter
j
2.0 Intertemporal elasiticity of substitution
ac
0.13 Share of imported goods on total consumption
c
0.9 Elast. of subst. between domestic and foreign goods
ax
0.13 Share of imported goods on total investment
x
0.5 Elast. of subst.between domestic and foreign goods
aG
0.13 Share of imported goods on total government expenditure
G
0.5 Elast. of subst.between domestic and foreign goods
0.035 Depreciation rate
0.5 Investment costs
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 57
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Table 1. Parameter Values (continued)
Parameter Value Description
ah
0.5 Share of Non-Ricardian labor on total supply
h
0.99 Elast. of subst.between Non-Ricardian and Ricardian labor
w0.5 Government’s share on total mining sector benefits
qwj
6 Elast. of subst. between intermediary union labors for
intermediary producers
wN
0.01 Probability of non-Ricardian unions not to optimize wage
wR
0.4 Probability of Ricardian unions not to optimize wage
a0.3 Share of capital on total production
qh
6 Elast. of subst. between intermediary goods on final
production
h
0.7 Probability of firms not to optimize price
m0.4 Exports elasticity
b
0.3 Elasticity of country risk premium.
gs
-0.025 Surplus target
1.03 Long-run domestic inflation
*
1.03 Long-run foreign inflation
b*
0.3 Long-run debt-GDP ratio
i*
1.0176 Long-run foreign nominal interest rate (quarterly)
i
1.0176 Long-run nominal interest rate (quarterly)
g
0.15 Mean of government expenditure to GDP shock
tc
0.08 Mean of consumption tax schock
tk
0.10 Mean of capital tax schock
tw
0.17 Mean of labor tax schock
tx
0.08 Mean of investment subsidy schock
Source: Author´s calculations.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
58
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Table 2. Calibration Results
Ratios Data Model Deviation
Private consumption to GDP 68.1% 66.5% 1.6%
Government consumption to GDP 14.6% 15% -0.4%
Private investment to GDP 19.3% 18.6% 0.7%
Non-oil exports to GDP 10.4% 13.7% -3.3%
Oil exports to GDP 5.4% 1.9% 3.5%
Net foreign liabilities to GDP 22% 22% 0%
Current account deficit to GDP 2.2% 0.1% 2.1%
Primary deficit to GDP 2.6% 2.3% 0.3%
Source: Author´s calculations.
IV. Results
A. Comparing Predicted and Observed Impulses Responses
Figure 3 shows the predicted responses by the model in key macroeconomic
variables to a shock in government spending. The model predicts an increase
in output that implies a fiscal multiplier of 0.9, value that is in line with our
empirical estimates. The model also predicts a rise in consumption of both
Ricardian and non-Ricardian agents. However, the rise in consumption of non-
Ricardian agents is much higher, 2.2, which allows the model to replicate the
fiscal multiplier. The consumption of this group of households increase because
of three facts: First, there is an expansion in hours worked as a response to
the government spending shock. The demand shock under sticky prices causes
output to increase and the labor demand curve shifts out. Second, the increase
in labor demand causes a rise in real wages which stimulates consumption.
Finally, the government spending is financed partly with public debt in such a
way that in the budget constraint of non-Ricardian households the real wage
increases more than taxes and consumption also rises.
Consumption of Ricardian agents also increases. Here, as illustrated by
Monacelli and Perotti (2008), with GHH preferences and sticky prices consump-
tion is higher when government spending increases. If prices are sticky, firms
face an outward shift in the demand curve for the variety they produce. On the
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 59
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
supply side, with these kind of preferences, the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure is independent of consumption, then, the
wealth effect is muted in the labor supply curve. But because of price sticki-
ness, movements in the real interest rate are limited. From the Euler equation,
Figure 3. Impulse-Response to a Government Spending Shock
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
-0.5 510 15 20
Non-Ricardian consumption
Basis pts. dev.
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
-0.2 510 15 20
Ricardian consumption
Basis pts. dev.
1.0
0.5
0
-0.5 510 15 20
Real GDP
Basis pts. dev.
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
-0.5 510 15 20
Total hours
Basis pts. dev.
0.02
0
-0.02
-0.04
-0.06
510 15 20
Total investment
Basis pts. dev.
1.5
1.0
0.5
0
-0.5 510 15 20
Total consumption
Basis pts. dev.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
60
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
this also limits changes in the marginal utility of consumption. In addition,
under GHH preferences, consumption and labor are complements “When labor
demand shifts out and hours increase along the labor supply curve, the mar-
ginal utility of consumption increases; to restore the initial value, consump-
tion too must increase (the derivative of the marginal utility of consumption
with respect to consumption is negative)” (Monacelli and Perotti, 2008).
The model also predicts an appreciation in the real exchange rate originated
in the monetary policy response to the inflationary pressure. The real interest
rate increases and there is a real exchange rate appreciation. As a result, the
current account as a percentage of GDP deteriorates and we observe the so
called twin deficit supported by the data. Finally, investment falls as a result
of the increment in the real interest rate, this dampens the output response
to the fiscal impulse.
Figure 3. Impulse-Response to a Government Spending Shock (continued)
0.6
0.2
0
-0.2 510 15 20
Real wage
Basis pts. dev.
0.4
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.3
-0.4 510 15 20
Net exports
Basis pts. dev.
-0.2
0.1
0.05
0
-0.05
-0.1 510 15 20
Real exchange rate
Basis pts. dev.
Source: Author´s calculations.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 61
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
B. Effects of a Transitory Shock to the Price of Oil: Comparing
Different Fiscal Rules
Now we turn to analyze the effects of an oil price shock on several macro vari-
ables. What the government does with the proceedings from oil depends on
its fiscal policy rule. In Figure 4 we plot the impulse responses of macroeco-
nomic variables to oil price shock of 1% for alternative fiscal policy rules. The
fiscal instrument used for the comparisons is transfers Tt while tax rates and
government spending are kept constant. Under a BBR
dd d
taxdebtoil
===0
()
,
that is, a completely procyclical fiscal policy, the government responds to the
additional oil revenue by increasing transfers to households, thus allowing
(them) to increase consumption. The increase in aggregate demand generates
incentives to labor demand, thus increasing wages and total hours worked.
The same increase in aggregate demand generates inflation and appreciates
the real exchange rate given the capital inflows. However, after four quar-
ters output falls resulting in macroeconomic volatility and the behavior of the
macroeconomic variables reverses.
In the case of a structural surplus fiscal rule, SSR,
dd d
taxdebtoil
=1,=0, =1
()
,
the government holds transfers relatively unchanged reducing macroeconomic
volatility. Output and consumption increase but in lower amount returning
faster to their steady state values that under the BBR. In this case, output
increases but half the magnitude that in the case of the BBR. However, it does
not fall later and its convergence is smoother than in the other two rules. We
observe a similar behavior in consumption, total hours and real wage. Real
exchange rate still appreciates but in a lower degree. Finally, a countercyclical
rule, CCR, which implies lowering transfers to households, results in the worse
scenario in terms of household´s consumption. A government too conserva-
tive would cause a fall in consumption of about 4 per cent with a recovery in
the third quarter almost negligible. Output would not fall as much because
CPI inflation would fall and the Central Bank response would be to decrease
interest rate which increases investment. Volatility under the CCR rule is as big
as in the case of BBR and much higher than in the SSR. The results presented
here for the BBR, which has been the rule that better resembles government´s
fiscal policy during the years of increase in oil prices (since 2002), are in line
with the stylized facts presented in Figure 1.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
62
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Figure 4. Impulse-Response to an Oil Price Shock
Source: Author´s calculations.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 63
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Turning to welfare analysis derived from the different fiscal rules, in Figure 5
we present different values of welfare gain, , for the fiscal rule as a function
of the parameters
dd
oiltax
and
which range between 0 and 2.5. The param-
eter value of
dd
oiltax
==0
corresponds to the baseline BBR against which
all parameter combination are compared. We hold the
ddebt
coefficient at a
baseline value of zero.
The bottom subplot shows the overall welfare results. We find that welfare
gains do not change very much in response to the coefficient
dtax
. However,
welfare gains are hump-shaped in relation to
doil
, with a maximum near 1. The
corresponding welfare gain for the parameter values
dd
oiltax
==1
are the best
combination of parameter values and this corresponds to the SSR as mentioned
before. In the case of a very procyclical rule, where the parameter values are
close to 0, the welfare gains are low. Finally, if the fiscal authority opt for a
countercyclical rule, CCR, and
doil=2.5
there are very steep losses.
Finally, it is also of interest to analyze whether the welfare gains are the same
for the two subgroups of agents. Figure 5 also plots the welfare gain for each
group of agents. There, we observe that the SSR is particularly welfare improv-
ing in the case of the non-Ricardian households, with a welfare gain of 2%,
while in the case of Ricardian agents the welfare gain is almost negligible. The
intuition behind this result is that in the case of the non-Ricardian households,
a structural fiscal policy rule, SSR, helps to improve welfare because the govern-
ment smooths consumption of non-Ricardian households when faced with an
exogenous shock to oil revenues. In the case of Ricardian agents, they smooth
consumption and the fiscal policy does not improve their welfare. Therefore,
the presence of non-Ricardian households in the economy justifies the use of
a structural fiscal rule that plays the role of a stabilizer.
C. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction
Under Different Fiscal Rules
In an inflation targeting regime, the monetary authority has to react to infla-
tionary or deflationary pressures. An oil price shock pressures the general price
level and the central bank has to deal with that. One of the results that we
observed in the previous subsection was that the fiscal policy rule might help
to stabilize the behavior of the macroeconomic variables and enhance welfare.
Another question that surges is the degree to which the fiscal policy might
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
64
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
Figure 5. Welfare Under Different Parameters of Fiscal Rule
Non-Ricardian
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1
-0.2
3
2
1
000.5 11.5 22.5
dtax doil
Welfare gain %
Ricardian
4
2
0
-2
-6
3
2
1
000.5 11.5 22.5
dtax doil
Welfare gain %
x10-3
-4
Total
0.1
0.05
0
-0.1
3
2
1
000.5 11.5 22.5
dtax doil
Welfare gain %
-0.05
Source: Author´s calculations.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 65
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
enable the central bank to have a less aggressive monetary policy. To answer
this question, we perform a welfare analysis exercise where we compare the
welfare gain of a procyclical fiscal rule, a structural fiscal rule and a coun-
tercyclical fiscal rule for different values of the parameter
(the feedback
coefficient of inflation in the monetary policy rule). The parameter value of
ranges between 2 (higher than one by the Taylor´s principle) and 9. The
baseline is a parameter value of
=2
. The results are presented in figure 6.
We observe that in the case of the procyclical and the countercyclical fiscal
rules the welfare gains are very high when we increase
from 2 to 6. While
in the case of the structural fiscal rule a parameter value of
of 3 is enough
to maximize the welfare gain. In the later, the gain from increasing the feed-
back parameter of inflation is not as big as in the case of a very aggressive
monetary policy rules in the other two rules. This shows that under the struc-
tural fiscal rule, SSR, the monetary policy can be less aggressive in fighting
inflation. It is worth noting that in the analysis, the Central Bank targets CPI
inflation like is the case in Colombia.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper presents evidence of the growing importance of government´s oil
revenues since the recent increases in oil prices. It also shows the importance
that oil output has gain in total output and oil exports in total exports. The
management of oil revenues by the government is of crucial importance for
the macroeconomic performance in Colombia. In the paper, we developed a
fiscal model for the Colombian economy that matches the stylized facts of a
government spending shock by allowing non-Ricardian agents, price and wage
rigidities and public debt.
The model was used to analyze the effects of an oil price shock in the dif-
ferent macroeconomic variables depending on the kind of fiscal rule that the
government uses to manage oil revenues. It was shown that Colombia would
benefit from implementing a Structural Surplus Rule similar to the one used
in Chile or Norway to save oil revenues in the form of reduced debt, instead
of being procyclical during the booms. In that case, macroeconomic volatility
would be reduced and the welfare gains would be important given that this
rule would help non-Ricardian agents to smooth consumption.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
66
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
The paper also shows that if the fiscal authority implements a SSR, the Central
Bank does not need to be aggressive in fighting inflation. The feedback coef-
ficient on the Taylor rule would be near 3 while in the case of a BBR like the
one followed until now would be around 6 in order to maximize welfare.
References
BEJARANO, J. A. (2005). “Estimación estructural y análisis de la curva 1.
de Phillips neokeynesiana para Colombia”, Ensayos sobre Política Econó-
mica, 48:64-117.
BLANCHARD, O. J., AND LEIGH, D. (2013). Growth forecast errors and 2.
fiscal multipliers (Working Papers 13/1). International Monetary Fund.
Figure 6. Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interaction
Procyclical rule
0.025
0.02
0.015
0.01
Welfare gain %
0.005
0246810
Structural rule
8
4
0
-2
Welfare gain %
-1024 6810
x10-4
6
2
-4
-6
-8
0.02
0.016
0.01
0.008
Welfare gain %
0246810
0.018
0.014
0.006
0.004
0.002
0.012
Countercyclical rule
Source: Author´s calculations.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 67
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
BONALDI, P., GONZÁLEZ, A., AND RODRÍGUEZ, D. (2011). “Importancia 3.
de las rigideces nominales y reales en Colombia: un enfoque de equili-
brio general dinámico y estocástico”, Ensayos sobre Política Económica,
66(29):48-78.
CALVO, G. A. (1983). “Staggered prices in a utility-maximizin g 4.
framework”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 12(3):383-398.
COLCIAGO, A. (2011). “Rule of thumb consumers meet sticky wages”, 5.
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 43:325-353.
CORBO, V., AND SCHMIDT-HEBBEL, K. (1991). “Public policies and saving 6.
in developing countries” (Policy Research Working Paper Series 574).
The World Bank.
CÉSPEDES, L. F., FORNERO, J., AND GALÍ, J. (2012). Non-ricardian aspects 7.
of fiscal policy in Chile (Working Paper 663). Central Bank of Chile.
FERGUSSON, L. (2003). Tributación, crecimiento y bienestar: el caso 8.
colombiano (1970-1999) (Documentos CEDE 003662). Universidad de
los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
GALÍ, J., LÓPEZ-SALIDO, J. D., AND VALLÉS, J. (2007). “Understanding 9.
the effects of government spending on consumption”, Journal of the
European Economic Association, 5(1):227-270.
GARAVITO, A., IREGUI, A. M., AND RAMÍREZ, M. T. (2012). Determi-10.
nantes de la inversión extranjera directa en Colombia: un estudio a
nivel de firma (Borradores de Economía 714). Banco de la República
de Colombia.
GERTLER, M., GILCHRIST, S., AND NATALUCCI, F. (2003). External cons-11.
traints on monetary policy and the financial accelerator (Working Paper
10128). National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
GREENWOOD, J., HERCOWITZ, Z., AND HUFFMAN, G. W. (1988). “Inves-12.
tment, capacity utilization, and the real business cycle”, American
Economic Review, 78(3):402-417.
Fiscal Policy in a Small Open Economy with Oil Sector
68
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
HAMANN, F., LOZANO, I., AND MEJÍA, L. F. (2011). Sobre el impacto 13.
macroeconómico de los beneficios tributarios al capital (Borradores de
Economía 668). Banco de la República de Colombia.
KUMHOF, M., AND LAXTON, D. (2009). Simple, implementable fiscal 14.
policy rules (IMF Working Paper 09/76). International Monetary Fund.
LOZANO, I., AND RODRÍGUEZ, K. (2011). “Assessing the macroeconomic 15.
effects of fiscal policy in Colombia”, Journal of Financial Economic
Policy, 3(3):206-228.
LOZANO, I., AND TORO, J. (2007). Fiscal policy throughout the cycle: 16.
The Colombian experience (Borradores de Economía 434). Banco de la
República de Colombia.
LÓPEZ, E., MONTES, E., GARAVITO, A., AND COLLAZOS, M. M. (2012). La 17.
economía petrolera en Colombia marco legalcontractual y sus principales
efectos sobre la actividad económica del país (parte I) (Borradores de
Economía 692). Banco de la República de Colombia.
LÓPEZ, M. (2001). “Seigniorage and the welfare cost of inflation in 18.
Colombia”, Ensayos sobre Política Económica, 39:115-131.
LÓPEZ, M., PRADA, J. D., AND RODRÍGUEZ, N. (2009). “Evidence for a 19.
financial accelerator in a small open economy, and implications for
monetary policy”, Ensayos sobre Política Económica, 60(27):12-45.
MONACELLI, T., AND PEROTTI, R. (2008). Fiscal policy, wealth effects and 20.
markups (Discussion Paper 7099). CEPR.
MONACELLI, T., AND PEROTTI, R. (2010). “Fiscal policy, the real exchange 21.
rate and traded goods”, Economic Journal, 120(544):437-461.
MOUNTFORD, A., AND UHLIG, H. (2009). “What are the effects of fiscal 22.
policy shocks?”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 24(6):960-992.
PIESCHACÓN, A. (2012). “The value of fiscal discipline for oil-exporting 23.
countries”, Journal of Monetary Economics, forthcoming.
Andrés González, Martha López, Norberto Rodríguez y Santiago Téllez 69
D E S A R R O . S O C . NO. 73, B O G O T Á , P R I M E R SE M E S T R E D E 2014, P P . 33-69, I S S N 0120-3584
PRADA, J. D., AND ROJAS, L. E. (2009). La elasticidad de Frisch y la trans-24.
misión de la política monetaria en Colombia (Borradores de Economía
555). Banco de la República de Colombia.
RAMEY, V. A. (2011). “Identifying government spending shocks: It’s all 25.
in the timing”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(1):1-50.
RAVN, M. O., SCHMITT-GROHÉ, S., AND URIBE, M. (2007). Explaining the 26.
effects of government spending shocks on consumption and the real
exchange rate (Working Paper 13328). National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
RESTREPO, J. E. AND RINCÓN, H. (2006). Identifying fiscal policy shocks 27.
in Chile and Colombia (Borradores de Economía 397). Banco de la
República de Colombia.
SCHMITT-GROHÉ, S. AND URIBE, M. (2003). “Closing small open economy 28.
models”, Journal of International Economics, 61(1):163-185.
SMETS, F. AND WOUTERS, R. (2007). “Shocks and frictions in US busi-29.
ness cycles: A bayesian DSGE approach”, American Economic Review,
97(3):586-606.
VARGAS, H., GONZALEZ, A., AND LOZANO, I. (2012). “Macroeconomic 30.
effects of structural fiscal policy changes in Colombia”, in for Inter-
national Settlements, B. (Ed.), Fiscal policy, public debt and monetary
policy in emerging market economies (Vol. 67 of BIS Papers chapters, p.
119-160). Bank for International Settlements.
