The crime of aggression in the Statute of the International Criminal Court: political consensus vs. dogmatic dissent
| Autor | Giselle Herrera Kheneyzir |
| Cargo | Abogada (cum laude) de la Universidad de los Andes con opción en Economía |
| Páginas | 2-40 |
T
S I C
C
G H K
1 Abogada (cum laude) de la Universidad de los Andes con opción en Economía. Correo electrónico: giselleherrera88@gmail.com Coautora del artículo
“Pierre Menard, ¿autor del Quijote?” Diálogo teórico-etílico sobre la interpretación jurídica y literaria, Revista Mayéutica, Agosto de 2009, No. 2. http://
programasocrates.uniandes.edu.co/mayeutica/mayeuticapp.html. Este artículo es el producto de una tesis de pregrado dirigida por el profesor René
Urueña.
Abstract
On June 2010 the First Review Conference on
-
nition and conditions for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over the crime of aggression. Despite such
historic agreement, the content and characte-
ristics of the crime of aggression remain subject
to great discussion among legal scholars. This
article aims to explore the antecedents and pre-
paratory works that culminated in the adoption
the key elements of the approved proposal, as
well as to identify its possible shortcomings in
order to sketch new arguments for its interpre-
tation, application and/or reform.
Keywords crime of aggression, act of aggres-
sion, use of force, individual criminal responsi-
bility, state responsibility.
Resumen
En junio de 2010 la Primera Conferencia de
Revisión del Estatuto de la Corte Penal Inter-
crimen de agresión y el régimen jurisdiccional
del mismo. A pesar de este acuerdo histórico,
el contenido y las características del crimen si-
guen siendo objeto de discusión entre juristas
internacionales. Este artículo busca explorar
los antecedentes y trabajos preparatorios que
-
-
para su interpretación, aplicación y/o reforma.
Palabras clave crimen de agresión, acto de
-
nal individual, responsabilidad estatal.
Sumario
I I DEFINING THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION A. Annex I Amendments to the Rome Statute of the
I C C A C II. AGGRESSION UN
DER SCRUTINY A T B R -
C C
III. FINAL REMARKS ON THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION C B
Giselle Herrera Kheneyzir
Julio - Diciembre de 2011 - Universidad de los Andes - Facultad de Derecho - Revista de Derecho Público N.o 27
4
I
The night of June 11 2010, during the First Re-
view Conference on the ICC Statute, agreement
-
ditions for the exercise of jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression. The decision, surprisingly
adopted by consensus, amends the Rome Sta-
tute and ends a long-standing debate over the
topic, but most importantly, gives birth to a com-
law. Despite such historic consensus, as with all
-
teristics of the crime of aggression remain sub-
ject to great discussion among legal scholars.
This article aims to explore the antecedents
and preparatory works that culminated in the
1, to describe and
-
posal, as well as to identify its possible shor tco-
mings in order to sketch new arguments for its
interpretation, application and/or reform.
make a brief account of the major historic de-
velopments that preceded the abovementio-
ned amendment, from the standpoints of both
public international law and of international
criminal law. Secondly, the discussion will shift
-
tion, providing a general evaluation of its core
components. An in-depth examination of the
acts of commission and applicable theories of
1 The amendments regulating the jurisdictional regime for the crime of
aggression, contained in articles 15 bis and 15 ter of the Rome Statute,
will not be addressed by the present article.
criminal responsibility, and of the objective re-
quirements of an act of aggression as the mate-
rial element of the crime will guide this section.
Subsequently, some brief remarks on the ade-
quate interpretation and application of the Sta-
tute provisions on the crime of aggression will
be made. Finally, the last section will highlight
the most relevant conclusions to be drawn from
this overall assessment.
I DE FINING TH E CRIME
OF AGGR ESS ION
The prohibition of aggression as an internatio-
nal obligation binding upon States can be traced
back to almost a century ago, though attempts
-
-
me are relatively more recent.
Reference is made to the Kellog-Briand Pea-
instrument establishing this rule2, as article 1
of this treaty states that “The High Contracting
Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
respective peoples that they condemn recourse
to war for the solution of international controver-
sies, and renounce it, as an instrument of natio-
nal policy in their relations with one another”3.
However, a more comprehensive provision could
already be found in the Covenant of the League
of Nations, whose article 10 prescribed that
“The Members of the League undertake to res-
2 Glennon, Michael J., The Blank-Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 Yale J.
Int’l L. 73 (2010).
3 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of Natio-
nal Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
Para continuar leyendo
Solicita tu prueba
COPYRIGHT Universidad de Los Andes, Facultad de Derecho
