A proposed taxonomy of eliminativism - Núm. 27, Julio 2017 - Revista Co-herencia - Libros y Revistas - VLEX 699202577
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A proposed taxonomy of eliminativism

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Vincent
AutorBernardo Pino
CargoDoctor of Philosophy, University of Sheffield. Académico Regular, Facultad de Educación, Universidad de las Américas, Chile
Páginas181-213
181
Revista Co-herencia Vol. 14, No 27 Julio - Diciembre de 2017, pp. 181-213. (ISSN 1794-5887 / e-ISSN 2539-1208)
In this paper, I propose a general taxonomy of diffe-
     
by exploring eliminativism from a broad perspective,
providing a comparative picture of eliminativist projects in different
        
         
The proposed taxonomy is an attempt to systematise those arguments

Keywords:
Eliminativism, eliminativist argument, eliminativist claim, theo-

Una propuesta de taxonomía para el eliminativismo
En este artículo, propongo una taxonomía general de
 
-
de una perspectiva amplia, proporcionando un cuadro comparativo
   
    -
    -
   

Palabras clave:
    -

Abstract
Resumen
Bernardo Pino**
bpino@ug.uchile.cl
A proposed taxonomy
of eliminativism*
Recibido: abril 22 de 2017 | Aceptado: junio 27 de 2017
DOI: 10.17230/co-herencia.14.27.8
* The present work de-
rives from related re-
search done during my
PhD studies at the Uni-

** Doctor of Philosophy,
 
Académico Regular,
Facultad de Educa-
ción, Universidad de
  
ORCID ID: 0000-0002-
0906-6562
182 A proposed taxonomy of Eliminativism
Bernardo Pino
-
ism is the claim that denies the existence of some type of thing in
          
into this topic is that there is extensive literature about eliminativ-
ism regarding mental states and our commonsensical understanding

scope of eliminativism is exhausted by the intricate debates about
the mind that have been taking place among philosophers and cog-

         

paper intends to take a step back and explore eliminativism from a

As we will see, people can be eliminativists about different
          
 
       
        

this does not mean to say that people holding eliminativist claims
regarding these different types of things are all eliminativists in the
       
that there are different ways of denying that there are some X’s and,
therefore, that there are different ways of being an eliminativist

In general, whereas eliminativist claims seem to be alike in that
they involve rejecting some candidate for eliminativism, there is
not just one type of argument for eliminativism that applies to all

domains are the same, while it can also be the case that there are

   -


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Revista Co-herencia Vol. 14, No 27 Julio - Diciembre de 2017, pp. 181-213. (ISSN 1794-5887 / e-ISSN 2539-1208)
Eliminating demons, chairs and moral properties


-
lowing cases of supernatural beings, artefacts, and moral properties,
1
a) The case of demons
Belief in magic and the workings of supernatural beings is com-
mon to all human cultures and ascribing responsibility to demonic

sight, developmental abilities, or diseases such as epilepsy) is a com-
   
with the expansion of our reliable knowledge about the workings of
natural things in the world around us, demonic explanations have

to accept the involvement of magical or demonic causes in people’s
health and diseases at the expense of natural causes as informed by

to explain the exact causes of diseases, as well as any other natural

for instance, the following remark made by Ramsey (2013) when

The notion of a demon is just too far removed from anything we now posit
          
  

Underlying eliminativism about demons is a principle that we
may call causal exclusion    
of a particular type of phenomenon are found to have causes of a
certain kind, then there will be no causal room left for certain other
   
presumed existence is proved unnecessary for explaining natural
1 For clarity of exposition, I will focus on some paradigmatic version of the eliminativist arguments


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