State tolerance is an offence, not a virtue
| Autor | René González de la Vega |
| Cargo | ITAM, Mexico DF. PhD (c) Katholieke Universiteit Brussel (KUB), Belgium. Master of Legal Theory, European Academy of Legal Theory, Brussels, Belgium |
| Páginas | 113-130 |
113
Revista Co-herencia Vol. 8, No 14 Enero - Junio 2011, pp. 113-130. Medellín, Colombia (ISSN 1794-5887)
En este artículo se fundamenta una idea sencilla:
en la actualidad muchos líderes políticos usan el
término tolerancia para calificar sus propias ac-
titudes hacia cierto tipo de personas, prácticas y culturas. La pre-
gunta es simple: ¿al estado tolerante se le permite hablar (moral y
conceptualmente) acerca de la tolerancia? La tesis defendida por
el autor es que el Estado liberal moderno no puede (por razones
conceptuales) y no debe (por razones morales) hablar acerca de
la tolerancia.
Palabras clave
Tolerancia, Estado liberal, Neutralidad, Razones morales.
State tolerance is an offence, not a virtue
In this article the author makes a simple claim:
in present days, several political leaders use the
term tolerance to qualify their attitudes towards
certain kind of people, practices and cultures. The question is
simple: Is the tolerant state allowed (morally and conceptually)
to speak about tolerance? The thesis defended by the author is
that the modern liberal State cannot (because of conceptual
reasons) and should not (because of moral reasons) talk about
tolerance.
Key words
Tolerance, Liberal State, Neutrality, Moral Reasons.
State tolerance is an
offence, not a virtue*
Recibido: febrero 28 de 2011 | Aprobado: marzo 31 de 2011
* This article comes from
the conclusions of my
PhD Dissertation en-
titled “Tolerance as a
Moral Ideal in contem-
porary Liberalism: A
Conceptual and Justifi-
catory Analysis”. Katho-
lieke Universiteit Brussel
(KUB), Belgium. Advi-
sor: Luc J. Wintgens.
** ITAM, Mexico DF. PhD
(c) Katholieke Univer-
siteit Brussel (KUB),
Belgium. Master of Legal
Theory, European Aca-
demy of Legal Theory,
Brussels, Belgium.
Resumen
Abstract
René González de la Vega**
rene.gonzalezdelavega@itam.mx
114
In the past few years, leaders of Liberal States have been using,
in recurrent circumstances, the term “(in)tolerance” to qualify the
attitudes they hold towards certain acts, conducts, type of people or
beliefs. In this vein, the declaration of President Sarkozy towards
Rumanian gypsies or the attitudes of President Bush towards Arab-
American citizens are examples of intolerant attitudes. Parliament
leader Geert Wilders refers to himself as an intolerant person towards
anything of Arab or Muslim origin and Mexican President, Felipe
Calderon, called the international gay day “the day for tolerance”.
Many further examples of this reality can be given. As a matter of
fact, this is also a common idea within specialized literature: as far
as the relationship between liberalism and tolerance is concerned,
one of the claims is that the attitude adopted (or that should be
adopted) by a liberal State is that of a tolerant State.
Against all this current thought, in this paper I will defend the
following thesis:
A liberal State cannot (for conceptual reasons) and should not (for moral
reasons) be a tolerant State
It is important to not loose sight of the fact that when I speak of
a «liberal State» and of a «tolerant State» it is because I am moving
within a public sphere of the discussion, and that by definition the
public is distinct from the private. If we take this into account, then
the thesis does not exclude the possibility of there being people,
individuals, who feel committed to liberal thought or to the philo-
sophy of liberalism and are also tolerant.1 Then, the thesis does not
rule out the fact that liberalism may be understood in different ways:
as a policy of the State, as a type of education, as a form of ethics or
a school of thought.2
We must also bear in mind that I have mentioned two types of
reasons to justify why I sustain this thesis. The first reason mentio-
1 Although, as we will see in the following section, I will defend the notion that this is only possible if we
do not adopt a version of monistic liberalism and a universalist conception of morality.
2 See, “Introduction”, in (Rawls, 1996). Besides John’s Rawls mentioning this possibility, a philosopher
that has argued this possibility with great forcefulness and at great length is Bruce Ackerman (1980: 154
and ss.).
State tolerance is an offence, not a virtue
René González de la Vega
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